邢唷> 欹 Rbjbj++ 0霢霢%8l^, 4",S!$d4.0 $$ $ L:    SPINOZA AND HIS READING OF MAIMONIDES. THEOLOGY AND POLITICS. Spinoza (1632-1677) does not quote Maimonides a lot in his Theologico-politics Treatise, yet when he does, he is very sharp, ironic and even disdainful towards him. In his Guide for the perplexes Maimonides (1135-1204) wanted to guide his pupil Rabbi Iosef Ibn Yehouda - a perplexed pupil who had received a Jewish education, studying both the Bible and the Talmud (the Oral Law) but he had also started learning philosophy, mainly Aristotle and his Muslim disciples and could not understand whether he could be both a religious man or a theologian and a philosopher. Maimonides wanted to help him understand that he did not have to give up reading and studying the Bible (the Torah) and to study philosophy only on the pretence that the Torah is too na飗e and speaks a language which is irrelevant for philosophers (images, anthropomorphisms, stories and so on). If such was the case the Bible would be a book for the ignorant people only. Maimonides argues that it抯 not the case and that it抯 possible to be both a philosopher and to read the Bible or rather to be a philosopher when reading it. Now, according to Spinoza, such an endeavour is worthless and pointless, it is also a dangerous attitude especially from a political point of view. Maimonides抯 allegorical interpretation of the Torah is described by Spinoza as 搑idiculous, dangerous, useless and absurd (French translation of the TPT, Trait th閛logico-politique, p. 91; 321). Spinoza argues that his own rational method is much more helpful for the perplexes of his own time: these perplexes (may be Spinoza was one of them when a young man?) will have to choose between becoming a philosopher and between becoming a theologian, but they will be forbidden to be both of them at the same time! As we shall see, according to him, the Bible will be worth reading only because it helps ignorant people to become moral. Spinoza calls these ignorant people 搕he vulgaire which means all those people, including all the women, who do not lead a philosophical and rational life. All those people who need someone else to tell them what to do and who obey for fear they will punished or because they hope they will receive a reward. The main point is here that the frontiers between philosophy and theology are - and must remain - unopened. What is at stake in this very severe criticism of Maimonides by Spinoza? The main question is a political one: Spinoza wants to stand up for the freedom of thought in a State that would not be pledged to any religious powers. In his own time these powers were Christian powers mainly, there was no such thing as a secular State. Yet in his book he criticizes Maimonides as though he was a Jewish theologian who wants to prevent people from thinking freely. And of course, if such is really the case - which is not sure - it is indeed a necessary condition to describe Maimonides抯 endeavour as ridiculous and dangerous since according to Spinoza only a purely political state - a state that has nothing to do with religious ideas - is untitled to protect this freedom of thought. Now from a conceptual point of view, the conflict between the two thinkers is not so simple. In his Treatise, Spinoza is dependant on Maimonides抯 concepts and questions even when he criticizes him in a sharp way. He quotes him in Hebrew and from time to time he also quotes exactly the same biblical verses, in the same order, as Maimonides does in his Guide (but without acknowledging it) so as to prove something different. One must remember that Spinoza had read some philosophical Jewish books since at that time Jewish philosophy was not relegated to the inoffensive field of the Jewish studies as it is now almost always the case, it was really part of philosophy. In the Middle Ages, one could speak of a Jewish, or Christian or Muslim philosophy without being accused of mixing two different things. Now Spinoza - and so many philosophers after him - argues that philosophy is a pure rational way of looking at things. Therefore it cannot be Jewish, or Christian or Muslim. Philosophy is therefore incompatible with any religious book, especially because the books of the Jews, of the Christians and of the Muslims are prophetical books and Spinoza argues that the prophets are full of imagination but they lack the philosophical way of reasoning. If reason (the Logos, the Greek language) is a universal tool, the philosopher has to remain indifferent to whatever practical or ideological, or even spiritual, interest such or such a people or such or such a person may find in a religious book. It means we may never discover any speculative interest in reading these religious books. It is therefore useless to try to find a speculative truth hidden within the images and the stories of the Torah as Maimonides tried to do. These books belong to the particular history of a people and they must be studied as such. A philosopher is unconcerned with this particular history even if it remains useful for the non philosophers, especially from a moral point of view as I have just mentioned. Of course one has to keep in mind that Spinoza had been cast out from his own Jewish community when he wrote his Tractate (this excommunication is called a Herem and it was very severe). Now he could have found an ally with Maimonides who was also much criticized in his own time by his fellow Jews. We know his Guide (written in Arabic, the language of the philosophers at that time as Latin was the language of the philosophers at Spinoza抯 time) was burnt in some places and he was not (and still is not) studied in most Yeshivot (religious Jewish schools) whereas his Michn Torah, his commentary to the oral Law (written in Hebrew, the language most Jews could understand) is studied with much respect. From the view point of the opponents of Maimonides one has to separate the Torah from any philosophical speculation; Spinoza also praised such a separation but for obviously completely different reasons. Now if we keep in mind that the Talmud is not a dogmatic way of looking at things and that the discussions (the Makhloquet) between the sages are strong and sometimes even without any conclusion (搕he discussion remained without any end (Teku) is a common place expression in the Guemara = the long discussion between the sages on such or such a point), we may wonder why Spinoza抯 interpretation of the Bible was unacceptable by the Jews of his community. It seems to me that it is not so much because of what Spinoza really said (since there are so many different opinions in Judaism) but because he argued that what he said was the definite truth and also because he did not want to lead a Jewish life as it was asked from him). In a letter to a friend Spinoza wrote that he is a friend of all the people who are really looking for truth, yet though Maimonides had been looking for it also, all his life on, Spinoza could not become friend with him. We have to try to understand why more deeply. I will not deal with all the reasons for such an antagonism, I will only stress three main reasons: - the interpretation of the Torah by both thinkers and its political consequences. - the difference between a human law and a divine law according to both thinkers. - Politics and theology. What is a free Republic? 1. The philosopher and the Bible. Maimonides quotes the Talmud: 揟he Torah speaks the language of the human beings and we know this language is not a philosophical language but the ordinary language (Guide I, 26; I閎amoth 71a). That is why when speaking of God the prophets use an anthropomorphic (God has a strong hand) and anthropopathique (God is angry, or is worried about his people) language. Simple human beings attribute to God what they can understand or they imagine God in such or such a way that suits them. For example: If I say 揋od exists, a simple person will understand it means God has a body since it抯 impossible for him or her to imagine how it抯 possible to exist without a body. But it does not mean God has indeed a body and a philosopher like Maimonides cannot be satisfied with such an anthropomorphism neither can his pupil. Therefore he explains to him that he must not be content with the obvious and literal meaning of the verses but that he has to look for their real meaning using an allegorical method. The obvious meaning is called 搕he silver nets but the true meaning is called 搕he golden apples that are hidden in these nets. He quotes a proverb (25, section 11): 揂 word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver. The pictures of silver are useful for life, they describe what happened in the past and how we must live now (the commandments, the mitzvoth), whereas the 揳pples of gold stand for the philosophical truth hidden within these images, within the history and within the mitzvoth. A verse is always an allegory but one has to be a philosopher in order to decipher it. The Torah uses words that are equivocal, ambiguous and passionate. Now the philosopher has to find their true univocal meaning; since ambiguity leads to misunderstanding, Maimonides explains the meaning of quite a number of key words of the Bible in part one of his Guide. This allegorical method means he is looking for the philosophical idea hidden within the image. Opposing the anthropomorphic way of speaking of God, he also elaborate a negative way of speaking of Him: for example, he says, He is just or good but not in the way we understand the word 搄ust or 揼ood. (theology of the negative attributes). In his Guide Maimonides does not pray the Talmudic way of interpretation since, according to a well known parable in his book (III, section 51), the rabbis have not yet entered the Palace of the King, they turn around it but remain unable to find the true entrance (= the philosophical speculation on the principles of the Jewish religion). Only the philosopher may find it and once he has entered the palace he still has to get ready in order to contemplate the King and to listen to Him, which means he has to study metaphysics and get a true knowledge of God, this knowledge is also the highest love, an intellectual love of God as Spinoza will also say. There is therefore a hierarchy between the simple people, the Talmudist and the philosopher. The former are unable to understand truly, their imagination and their passions prevent them from getting a true knowledge. Only the philosopher is able to find 搕he golden apple, the simple people do not even guess there is any golden apple. When Spinoza quotes Maimonides, he argues that such an allegorical interpretation of the Torah is completely worthless. He speaks of this method of interpretation with sternness and irony since he maintains Maimonides only wants to find his own philosophical ideas - which are in fact Aristotle抯 ideas - within the Bible and he is ready to distort the verses in order to find them in it. Now Spinoza thinks there is no philosophical ideas at all in the Bible since the prophets did not want to demonstrate anything to the people but only wanted them to obey. More than that he says that if we have to turn to Aristotle or to any other philosopher to discover the so called philosophical truth of the Bible it would be better to study Aristotle and be content with such a study. Please keep in mind that such a criticism has a very important political implication that I will explain latter on. Both Maimonides and Spinoza want to discover the true meaning of the Bible, yet whereas for the former this true meaning is a philosophical one hidden within the biblical language, a meaning we have to decipher thanks to an allegorical way of interpreting the images; the latter thinks we must interpret the Bible according to what the prophets - especially Moses - wanted to achieve: they knew the people need to obey so as to become less passionate and violent and even more just and charitable towards their neighbour, they knew they were too much passionate and too much irrational in order to behave in a wise way of their own accord. The prophets were not transmitting any philosophical truth but only a moral teaching, a useful one for men and women who remained unable to look for wisdom and to behave with justice because they understand it抯 part of wisdom. The Bible remains a useful book for the simple people and also for the philosophers who are not yet - or not always - full of wisdom. One must bear in mind that there is no people of wise human beings, passions and misunderstanding will always be the lot of all peoples, and because of such limitations, the Bible will remain useful: it will lead people to morality because they will fear what will happen to them if they disobey and they will hope to receive a reward if they obey. The Bible has nothing to do with philosophy and with the quest for truth, at best it抯 a moral guide: it teaches simple people to be just and charitable. According to Spinoza (Tractate, chapter 7), one has to interpret the Torah from the imaginary view point of its authors. Therefore whereas Maimonides tries to discover one philosophical idea hidden within the images and the words that have several meanings, Spinoza wants to explain what the authors themselves thought about such and such event or situation, what they imagined about God and about His actions. For example when Moses said that God is a jealous God, it does not mean (as Maimonides would have it) that we have to understand truly what the attribute 搄ealous really symbolizes, it only indicates that Moses thought God was jealous. It is not true, it is not false either, it抯 only what he thought or rather imagined. Spinoza is one of the first philosopher to read the Bible from such an historical, immanent and genealogical point of view. For a philosopher such as Spinoza who would like to philosophize without using any words, and who praises Euclid because he only wrote in a very simple language - a mathematical one - that everyone could understand, whatever his or her usual language is, the language of the Bible is so ambiguous, so full of rhetorical figures, that it抯 impossible to find any philosophical truth in it. He argues that language generally speaking comes from imagination and not from reason, and that is why if we could write a philosophical treatise without using words, it would be much better (see the geometrical way of explaining his ideas in his main book the Ethics). Usual words do not deliver any philosophical truth, anthropomorphical descriptions of God only prove that Moses had a vivid imagination (as most prophets do). Moses did not want to uphold any theological thesis and Maimonides is wrong when he tries to find such a thesis in his speeches. One has to explain the Bible in a critical way: what did the people imagine or believe at that time; what their prophets wanted them to do, why they wanted them to obey and how they had them obey There is no external criterion - be it a philosophical one or an existential one - that may help us understand the Bible. Therefore when Moses says God talked to him and gave him a law, we don抰 have to try to understand what is the philosophical significance of such an assertion, as Maimonides would have it; neither do we have to criticise it and argue God is a pure spirit that does not speak as human beings do, or even maintain God does not exist. We only have to state a fact: Moses thought such was the case and it is neither false nor true, it抯 what he wanted the people to believe and probably what he believed himself. Such is the case for all the prophets, the prophets therefore are not philosophers and philosophers do not have to obey them. It抯 worth underlining here that, according to Spinoza, there is one noteworthy exception: he writes that Christ in the Gospels - he uses the word Christ and not Jesus, which is most unusual for a Jew - taught the people a truth he knew the people could not understand otherwise. That抯 why he had to make use of parables as Moses did, but he did not believe that the God described in these parables was the true God whereas Moses did. Moses remained prisoner of his imagination while Christ had received a true revelation, a true intellectual understanding. Whatever might be the value of such a difference between Moses and Christ, we must say that Spinoza is not here faithful to his own method of understanding the Bible - a pure internal interpretation - since when he says Christ knew the truth while Moses did not it抯 an external assertion, it does not come from the Bible itself. In spite of such a completely different interpretation of the Torah, both Maimonides and Spinoza praised the philosophical life - wisdom - and they argue that only such a life could be said a happy life. Yet they knew they had to live with people who despise wisdom and look for happiness otherwise, they imagine they will be happy if they receive honours, if they love their family (see what both Maimonides and Spinoza say about Job and his miseries in the Bible on such a matter) or get involved with trivial matters. That is also why both of them had to underline the importance of politics and especially the link between politics and theology either to comfort it (Maimonides) or to criticize it (Spinoza). 2. Divine law and human law. The distinction between a divine law and a human law comes from the medieval philosophers and it plays a key role both in Maimonides抯 Guide and in Spinoza抯 Theologico-political Tractate. - a law is human not because human beings (and not God) have invented it, but because of its aim. If a law tells us how to behave so that we may live together in a peaceful way, without fearing our neighbour抯 violence or his or her injustice; if a law tells us we must obey its orders because it抯 necessary for the welfare of everyone and especially our own welfare, it抯 a human law. This kind of law keeps the passions in check and help us acquire the habit of virtue; it helps us live in security and with a sound body.- a law is divine not because we think God gave it to human beings, but also because of its aim or of it抯 finality. If a law tells us what to do if we want to become happy and get a true knowledge about nature and about God; if it teaches us how to develop our intelligence so that we may understand nature and become wise, it抯 a divine law. This kind of law helps us understand the nature of things by their first causes. We must bear in mind that our own perfection - which also means our own happiness and philosophical salvation - depends on the perfection of our understanding things. Both for Maimonides and for Spinoza the best understanding of what really is (which means a profound denunciation of all the illusions and prejudices based on human passions) is required in order to get a knowledge of God and to love Him, which is the final goal of human action, which is human perfection. Now the determination of the means that are required for the attainment of such a goal is the aim of a divine law. A divine law teaches us that within the soul of the wise man understanding and virtue are one.Thus, social and political life (the human law) 搃s essentially founded in the concern with security and health, the means of attaining which are not within the capacity of man as a single individual, whereas the perfection of man depends only on such means (the divine law) as belong to the individual being (Leo Strauss).According to Maimonides who makes use of this famous distinction in his Guide, it抯 impossible to live only and directly under the protection of a divine law, we have to praise human laws since they organize our life with our fellow men and women and are necessary as such. We must praise all those who know how to cure our illnesses because they have learned physics and biology (Maimonides was a doctor) and because they teach us how to take care of our bodies, which is also part of a human law. Yet he thinks there is one law - and only one law - which is both human and divine: the law of Moses. This law is unique because it both teaches us how to live together (see the numerous precepts about justice towards the stranger, the poor, the orphan and the widow in the Bible for instance) and how to get a true knowledge of God (a God who created the world and who wants human beings to be delivered from any bondage for instance). For Maimonides these precepts (included in the law transmitted by Moses) are true by divine sanction, but reason discovers their wisdom and intelligibility. In the face of the orthodox religious Jews Maimonides defend the right of reason, in the face of the philosophers he underlines the limits of reason, thus his concern for revelation. (let us recall here that as an Aristotelian philosopher Maimonides argues that reason cannot decide on questions that are above our experience such as the question of whether the world has been created or is eternal). Now for Spinoza who also makes an important use of this distinction between the two laws, this is impossible: a law that is meant for people to obey so that they may live together - such as the law of Moses - cannot be a divine law. It抯 only a human law, among many others. 揑t is obvious that the greater part of the precepts contained in Mosaic law are to be observed not by individual, but by society in its entirety. So Spinoza deduces from the conception of the divine law he holds in common with Maimonides that the Mosaic law is not divine law (Leo Strauss). More than that Moses抯 human law is not a good one since we know it could not prevent the Jewish Kingdom from being destroyed. All political laws are human laws, which means they can抰 help us understanding nature and God (God is immanent to nature in Spinoza抯 philosophy, there is no creation) and becoming a wise person, a happy person. In Spinoza抯 terms, there is only one divine law, a pure divine law - the true ideas - and this ultimate aim is not revealed in Mosaic law, it抯 revealed to reason and to reason only. The revelation of the divine law is nothing else but philosophy.What is at stake? This is most important of course: is it possible to separate completely politics from theology? This question (which had been Machiavelli抯 question before being that of Spinoza) is also a main question in our modernity. Now if such is the case we can understand better why Maimonides was such a main opponent of Spinoza since he did not want to make a clear distinction between theology and philosophy on the one hand and between theology and politics on the other hand. He wanted to bring man closer to God via knowledge and to press human reason into the service of divine precepts. This religious-philosophical attitude was intolerable for Spinoza. He wants philosophy and politics to be completely separated from theology. Freedom of thought cannot be protected if we agree with Maimonides that there is one law that is both human and divine because if such was the case it would mean that even philosophers should obey the prophets - which is exactly what Maimonides says - so as to be able to discover the divine and philosophical truth hidden in the prophetic talks. Now for Spinoza there is no such thing as the co-existence of an inner philosophical truth within the boundaries of an imaginary and prophetic language. The prophets are not hidden philosophers Spinoza denies the possibility of such cooperation of intelligence and imagination, that is, a cooperation of both in perfection. The stronger the power of understanding; the weaker the power of imagination, and vice versa. If the law of Moses was really both divine (there is a philosophical truth in it which will give us bliss or beatitudo and salvation) and human (it抯 a law that helps us understand how we must live together and achieve a good and just society), as Maimonides would like it to be, it would also mean philosophers would not be free to look for truth on their own terms. That抯 why Spinoza is so severe towards Maimonides抯 allegorical method of interpretation of the Torah: it抯 worthless and dangerous to look for a so called philosophical truth hidden in a human law. 揝pinoza denies that fulfilment of Mosaic law is necessary for attaining beatitudo; for this law requires observance of ceremonies, i.e. actions which are themselves indifferent, and which are binding only by virtue of having been posited. With reference to certain regulations for sacrifices, he suggests that no one will ever be able to discover a reason for them. (Leo Strauss) A human law has nothing to do with philosophy and bliss (beatitudo ) and salvation. More than that, such a law might have been useful in past time when the Jewish people came out from their bondage in Egypt and needed to receive a law so as to be able to live together, but now that the Jewish state has disappeared and that the Jewish people are in exile, it抯 no more necessary according to Spinoza. The Jewish people don抰 have to obey a human law that has proved it is unable to prevent them from being defeated and scattered among other peoples. Let us recall here that Spinoza had already freed himself from the Jewish law (he did not live as an observant Jew) but has not yet found himself a free citizen in a liberal secular state (the Jews were not citizens of such states at that time). Now both Spinoza and Maimonides think: a. that 搕he human perfection pre-delineated in human nature consists simply in knowledge of God Yet 搕o the question 慽s purely human capacity sufficient for the conduct of life? the answer given by Maimonides is contradicted and completely opposed by Spinoza. (). Spinoza thinks philosophy - natural reason - is able to lead us to perfection and he despises Maimonides抯 allegorical method because it is founded on a different basis, since he thinks the words of the prophets have a cognitive value. We have already explained that Spinoza抯 critique presupposes that the literal meaning is the true meaning of the Scripture and, as such, has no cognitive value. b. that the great majority of people remain unable to understand why laws are necessary so that we may live peacefully together, and also so that philosophers may think and contemplate without being troubled by violent conflicts and terrible wars. They explain that the legislator must leave an impression on them, that is why he will try to have them fear punishment and hope rewards in return of their bad or good behaviour. Passions are the only mean to impress people because people are always passionate. A passionate person will compare himself or herself to his or her neighbour, he or she will tend to be jealous, full of hatred or greedy and so on. Spinoza even compares the 揷ommon herd to a horse that one has to contain by using a bit. Most people remain unable to look for truth and wisdom. Now are the legislators wise men? Spinoza does not think so either, Moses was not a wise man, he understood the people was passionate and he knew how to manage with them: since they feared punishments and were hoping a reward, he explained that God would punish them or give them a reward. But even though, it was not enough and the Jewish state was destroyed. Moses was not a wise man according to Spinoza since he also believed that such was really the case, he described God as a just King, as a severe judge and so on. Anyway there is no such thing as a prophetical wisdom argues Spinoza. The Mosaic law is but a particular - and not universal - law; it抯 an historical and positive law - and not an eternal law - and since Spinoza is a nominalist, he thinks there is no such thing as 揳 Jewish people, there are only individuals that become united for a while thanks to a political law, but when this law disappears, the so called people disappears as such. Maimonides抯 explanations are false or rather they are political. Although we may learn how to behave in a just and moral way if we obey the precepts of the Torah, the Mosaic law must not be described as a divine law, which means that in a free Republic, according to Spinoza, philosophers are free to look for truth without obeying the prophets or rather the theologians. 3. Politics and theology. What is a free Republic? This is still an important question for Jews, Christians and Muslim, yet although the answer Spinoza gave to it in his Tractate seems to be the best answer for modern people, we may wonder whether it is really always the case. What does Spinoza say? He does not only argue that in a free Republic, theologians have no right whatever to influence or to control politics, but he upholds a new doctrine: the Sovereign is the one who has the right to decide over all questions - both civil and religious questions - since nothing is above its right, which means in Spinoza抯 view, above its power. He is entitled to decide whether such or such form of worship, such or such ceremony or even such or such way of dressing, is allowed or forbidden for security reasons. One may pray as he or she wishes at home, but in the 損ublic space one has to be allowed to do so. Such a distinction between what is forbidden within the boundaries of the 損ublic space and what is allowed within the boundaries of the 損rivate space had already been made clear by Thomas Hobbes. We may also remember what had happened to the Jews who had remained in Spain or in Portugal after 1492 since Spinoza抯 family had suffered from this tragic history. The welfare of the free Republic is more important than the desire of a particular person or a particular group of persons to behave according to their religious belief. Spinoza says that all religions must remain in accordance with the political situation of the country and he explains that if one does not agree with the Sovereign he or she is not entitled to express his or her disagreement publicly, he or she will have to resist secretly, probably as the Marranos (the Jews who had to convert to Christianity less they would be expelled but who remain Jews secretly) did in Spain. Spinoza thinks it抯 the only resistance that may be allowed. We may recall here that Maimonides had to deal with the same question (at that time the Jews had to convert to Islam for the same reasons) but he gave a different answer since, according to him, if, for political reasons, it抯 impossible to express our faith publicly, we have better leave the country. We have to obey the law of the Kingdom we live in - according to the famous sentence, Dina deMalkhouta Dina (the law of the Kingdom is the law) - yet it does not mean the King (or the free Republic) has any right to prevent us from expressing our belief publicly although they have indeed the power to prevent us from doing so. A faith that would only rely on silence, invisibility and pure interiority, would slowly disappear. We know such was the case for many Marranos. It was easier of course for Spinoza to grant the Sovereign all the rights on such issues since he had already explained in his Tractate that the Bible is only worth our studying it because of its moral teaching. That抯 why we may alienate our right to interpret it publicly and our right to express our faith publicly as well. He even says that the Sovereign is the 搃nterpreter of the religion. For both Maimonides and Spinoza the best political system is the one that is able to remain stable for a long time. Now from such a view point we may understand that the Sovereign must fear all that may destabilize it. The free Republic is founded on a political pact that has to guarantee security and freedom to all citizens. The Sovereign has to persuade the people that it抯 better to obey the law than to disobey, it has to persuade everyone - and especially all those that remain unable to understand such an idea on a rational basis - that they will be punished if they disobey or that they will receive a reward if they obey. It means the Sovereign must know how to manipulate passions. Now there is one passion which is particularly dangerous: the religious passion and the theologians are apt to manipulate it in a most perilous way, that抯 why according to Spinoza this religious passion is a great threat for the political power.In his Tractate he explains that the Levites in the Kingdom of Israel (in pas times) were insubordinate and dangerous people and he stands up for the Kings. According to him the religious authorities (the Levites) are the ones who were responsible for the destruction of this Kingdom, and it also proves that the Mosaic law was not a good law since it could not prevent such a rebellion and such a destruction. Maimonides knew of course that the State was destroyed but he argues that it抯 not because the law was not a good law but because the people did not obey it. He praises neither the Levites nor the Kings but he stands for the famous distinction between kings, priests and prophets since 搉either Scriptures nor early rabbinic writings express any sympathy whatsoever for a system of government in which a single body or group possesses a monopoly of political authority . 揙nly the diffusion of power among various legitimate, sometimes legitimated, franchises can prevent its arbitrary exercise and thus preserve the covenantal spirit with which all Jewish political behaviour should be infused ( ). (See the three crowns: crown of Torah, crown of kehunah and crown of malkhut ). Does it mean Maimonides praises 搕heocracy? (a word invented by Flavius Joseph) I抦 not sure of that since he also praises the life of a religious community that may not have any political independence as was the case for all Jewish communities in his timeI will conclude now and express my belief that the questions at stake in this confrontation Spinoza/Maimonides are still our questions because the theological-political question remains alive even for those who are not religious people. Catherine Chalier.  Leo Strauss, Spinoza抯 Critique of Religion, New York, Schoken Books, 1982, p. 147-166 for the different quotations.  Suart A.Cohen, The three crowns, Structures of communal politics in early rabbinic Jewry, Cambrige University Press, 1990, p. 10.PAGE  PAGE 1 /   4 j      l s   . R a n s w & 0 A C  ! 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