邢唷> 欹[ 餜Abjbj0螑螑~ %ed8La,z"  $T!!!H4!!0mv <J0z=p8!!!!!!!!!!z!!!!!!!!!!!!! :  The voice and the book. According to Emmanuel Levinas when we search for what best characterises a human being, we should not think, as Aristotle did, of his/her ability to think in a rational way but of his/her openness to books, of his/her ability to read them. He was once asked: 揌ow does one begin thinking? and he answered: It probably begins through traumatisms or gropings to which one does not know how to give a verbal form: a separation, a violent scene, a sudden consciousness of the monotony of time. It is from the reading of books - not necessary philosophical - that these initial shocks become questions and problems giving one to think. The role of national literatures is here perhaps very important. Not just that one learns words from it, but in it one lives 憈he true life which is absent, but which is no longer utopian. I think that in the great fear of bookishness, one underestimates the 憃ntological reference of the human to the book that one takes for a source of information, or for a 憈ool of learning, a textbook, even though it is a modality of our being. Indeed, to read is to keep oneself above the realism - or the politics of our care for ourselves, without coming however to the good intentions of beautiful souls, or to the normative idealism of what 憁ust be. In this sense, the Bible would be for me the book par excellence(). Levinas抯 meditation on the importance of books for a human life remains a main feature of his philosophy till the end of his life. After he had discovered and described the responsibility for the other in a completely new philosophical way, after he had described human subjectivity as inhabited by the other and 搕he human as a breakthrough that occurs in being, he turns to the question of books again. 揑 have spoken of Scripture and the Book. I thought of their firmness which already tightens, hard as a verse, in all languages, before becoming letters traced by a stylus or quill. What one calls written in souls is at first written in books. Their status has always been too quickly made commonplace among the tools or cultural products of Nature of History () I think that across all literature the human face speaks or stammers, or gives itself a countenance, or struggles with its caricature. Among all books, Levinas gives a special status to the Bible, to the Book of Books, or to the Holy Scriptures, not because they have a sacred origin but because they signify 搕hrough the expression of the face of the other man that they illuminate() and also because they awaken in their readers so many new interpretations of their meaning. This multiplicity of interpretations is indeed inseparable from what a book is for Levinas, and especially in the case of the Bible: one has to interpret it but one has also to let it interpret one抯 life. Yet, if a book needs to be interpreted, it also means the lonely and silent words written on a piece of parchment, on paper or on an electronic device, remain powerless once written. They can抰 impose a meaning on anybody and they beg an interpretation from the person who reads them - or better said from the person who studies - in order to remain alive. They can抰 force a precise meaning since they rely entirely on the reader who turns to them and take care of them discovering anew their meaning, or better said discovering their power of meaning otherwise than previously thought. Now, contrary to a long philosophical tradition that argues thinking - especially thinking in a logical way - is a silent activity, Levinas argues thinking and language are inseparable. Moreover this language does not rely only on philosophical concepts but on all kinds of words - including concrete words, images and metaphors - that must be uttered in a lively way by someone to someone else. It抯 one of the main themes of his lectures in the Coll鑗e philosophique from 1947 until the publication of Totality and Infinity (1961). In these lectures he even emphasizes the key role of the voice and he agrees with Franz Rosenzweig抯 criticism of a classical philosophy which separates thinking and language, thinking and the other, thinking and time. Let us remember here that Rosenzweig was even very severe about Socrates抯 dialogues with his disciples since he argued the questions of these disciples never lead Socrates to change his mind, which is not the case in a real dialogue when I don抰 know what the other person is going to say. Socrates used to say thinking is a silent language within one抯 own psyche, not a lively dialogue with someone else.My main questions in this paper will be: 1 If, according to Levinas, there is an ontological reference of the human to the book, if what is written in souls is first written in books, what is exactly a book for him? What is the difference between a book and what he calls a document? Why does he describe the Bible as the book of the books? 2 Written words and oral words. The voice of the master and the voice of the disciple. Why does a new interpretation of a verse - a hidoush - have to be discovered while speaking to someone else? 3 The discovery of one抯 own psyche while reading the book of the books. Is a voice calling us in this book? 1 A book and a document. A book is not a document. In his preface to the French translation of R.Haim of Volozin抯 book, Nefesh HaHa飉 (The soul of life), Levinas praises it:: 揟his is an extraordinary book, it testifies to a complete and perfect culture, what it says 揷omes from the deepest interiority, from this marvellous dimension of consciences and books ().Now, if such is the case, what is indeed a book for Levinas? Why does he want us not to mistake it for a document, especially when this book is called 揝cripture? First we must recall that a document - or a book we read as though we were opening a mere document, not knowing anything about the greatness of books - relies on the desire of its writers to give us information about something. Or, better said, we imagine such is the case. When reading the Bible or the Talmud as though they were documents, we look for information about the past, about what the ancient Hebrew people or the Rabbis of the first centuries were trying to achieve at a certain historical time, about what they thought or imagined or wanted us to believe etc. Spinoza is one of the first philosophers to interpret the Bible from such a point of view. In his Theologico-Political Treaty, he even argues that there is no philosophical truth in the Bible but only meanings that are neither true nor false. These significations only testify to what the ancient prophets were imagining about God and about their fate. For instance, when they use an image such as: 搕he right hand of God (Ex 15, 6), we must not try to allegorize this image (it was Maimonides抯 error to do so, Spinoza argues) and do violence to the texts as the Rabbis did in their discussions trying to find some new understanding of such an image as though it was an inspired image. We must be content with saying: the ancient Hebrew imagine God as such, in an anthropomorphic manner. This task requires from us a scientific study: one has to have a good knowledge of grammar, philology, archaeology and nowadays of the humanities (especially history, linguistic and so on), to be an expert on such matters. It is, of course, hard work which relies on the presupposition that words and sentences once written a long time ago must be interpreted within the context of this past time (and not of our present). These words must be understood within the frame of past discussions and of past problems and not be taken at their face value or falsified on the pretence they have got new significations nowadays. Spinoza used to be sceptical about language in general and about the language of the Bible in particular: he writes that we have forgotten the true meaning of the Hebrew words as they first were understood in past times and that抯 why we can抰 have a true knowledge of most parts of the Scriptures. Levinas underlines that, in spite of its scientific achievements, Spinoza抯 exegesis and latter on the Science of Judaism - the so called historical method or biblical criticism - has 搉ever been able, to this day, to take the place of that other reading, the traditional reading of the Bible as a book and not as a document. Yet if this other reading has become more and more difficult for modern people, if they have forgotten what a book, is it抯 not because of Spinoza and of scientific rationalism. On the contrary, Levinas supports the thesis that it is because 搈en have ceased hearing the Word that 揵iblical criticism is gaining possession of the texts. He writes that our attention nowadays has become more and more 搃ncapable of perceiving the divine resonance of the Word, which, thus reduced to a linguistic fabric, itself requires the precautions of a science (). Now Levinas抯 main thesis on the ontological importance of books lies on the difference he establishes between the intention of the author抯 book and the wide range of meanings of his/her words. This is not a curse, this is a thesis on language, and especially on the language of the Bible. Are readers of documents aliens to such an idea? Certainly not, but in quite a different way than the readers of books. The French historian Marc Bloch also recognised there is such a discrepancy between the intention of authors and the possible meanings of their words and sentences. Once written the latter testify to something else. In his dialogue The Phaedrus, Plato had already noticed what was for him a curse weighing on written words: their authors could not help it that people would understand wrongly what they wanted to say. But the historian thinks he can overcome this curse; he wants to decipher the meaning of these words in spite of their ambiguities so as to get information about their authors: 揥hat a human being says or writes, all that he makes, all that he touches, can and must give us an information about him. For instance, a modern historian when studying the Bible or the Talmud from that point of view is eager to learn something new about the authors of the past, to learn something that these authors did not always mean to express explicitly. Bloch explains that an historian must extort from these authors information that they did not wish to give us ( ). Let抯 now turn to reading a book. When we do, it抯 not the knowledge of past times which is at stake, but our own life, our way of thinking as a precise and unique person, or as a people or as a community. A book does not only give us information about past events or people since even when it does it also inspires our own way of thinking and living now. There is a dialogue between the person who studies and the people who once wrote books. A reader of books knows he/she is responsible for them in a very particular way: a book relies on future generations. In the case of the Torah, the latter are responsible for the awakening of the spirit that remains hidden in the verses even when they have already been interpreted by famous sages or scholars. These verses still beg for a new interpretation (a hidoush). Such is the Jewish reading of the Bible. Levinas argues that when we mistake a book for a document this is precisely this point that we miss. As Spinoza did, we try to make the genealogy of the Bible instead of its exegesis. While the genealogical approach is mainly eager to discover new information and new knowledge about the past, exegesis is eager to find new meanings in the verses, meanings that have not yet been discovered as though they were waiting for us to discover them.A book - and not a document - and especially Scripture which has inspired so many other books, is inseparable from the history and the destiny of its readers, 揻rom their ways of perceiving the Signs, from the meaning their reading retains by predilection. It relies on their questions, the deepest of which are inspired by their sufferings and by their joys, by their despair and their hope, and not by a so called objective scientific study. These readers study the language of the book - letters, words, sentences - as if they were urging them (the readers) to become 搕heir interior space and to help them ascend to the multiplicity of significations they still hide. A book is thus already 搊verdetermined by the 慳ncient newness of the commentaries. Levinas asks: 揝cripture has a mode of being distinct from that of pure matter available to the grammarian抯 analysis. A being such that the history preceding counts less than the lessons following it; such that inspiration is measured by what it has inspired; such that a break is produced in the synchronic system of signs circulating within immanence so that, under cover of the first signified, other significations begin to make themselves heard, calling for a new Saying, an interpretation: these are some traits of an ontology that the scientific thematization of the text cannot but miss (). Only books, and not documents, call for such new interpretations (hidoushim) - as opposed to new discoveries concerning past times - because their language is an inspired language. Levinas says that the wings of the spirit that remain folded back within the letters are in need of a reader. He/she is the one who has to help them take their flight. When one mistakes a book for a document, one forgets such a task, one does not know a book may animate one抯 own life and interiority. In Levinas抯 words, one forgets the Saying and is content with the Said. Now if we want not to forget the Saying while reading a book, we also have to listen to the voices of those who study, we can抰 do it silently and without answering both the voices of the past and the voices of the present. Levinas insisted on that point in his first philosophical lectures at the Coll鑗e philosophique in Paris, just after the Second World War and I抣l turn to them now. 2癟he voice and the Saying. In his lecture untitled Parole et Silence, Word and Silence, given in 1948, Levinas says he disapproves of silence because it keeps alive inhumanity. This is indeed a stern charge against philosophers who despise ordinary words for being ambiguous and unable to lead us to truth. These philosophers teach us - as Socrates did - to examine ordinary words carefully so as not to be fooled by their lack of substance and to use dialectical means in order to submit them to reason as though, without such a submission, words would certainly delude us. Philosophers provide justification for their despising ordinary and live language because thinking - so they argue - may do without them. He/she who thinks must never expect words to be of any help, on the contrary they will lead him/her astray. We may recall here that Heidegger - whose philosophy Levinas was deeply acquainted with at that time - used to refer to the etymology of Greek words - before their being contaminated by ordinary language - as the unique source of an authentic thinking. He felt utter contempt for all ordinary words and for all languages except Greek and German, for their being non philosophical and leading us to an inauthentic life. In this lecture, Levinas refers to these traditional philosophical stances and he says he wishes to philosophize otherwise: he wants to give live language a priority over the language of thematization (the Said) and also to give oral words a moral right to judge silent contemplation or silent meditation. Such a priority presupposes the presence of the other. Levinas vindicates his position when he explains that usually philosophers recognize that language takes for granted the presence of another person but only because this other person may participate in the quest for a common truth, not because he/she speaks to us or reveals to us something really new, something that really surprises us. Although the traditional philosophical position might seem generous - any one may be invited to share this common truth - it抯 also an appeal on behalf of silence and solitude since the other person is never taught anything else but to think for oneself. As Levinas writes later on in Totality and Infinity, 揟his primacy of the same was Socrates抯 teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside - to receive nothing or to be free ().In this lecture that announces some of the main thesis of Totality and Infinity, Levinas says that his philosophical 搈ethod will subordinate the usual visual and silent privilege of light - the privilege of essence - to a phenomenology of sound. Sound destabilizes our tranquillity and our silence. When hearing a sound it抯 as though time was introducing itself in our language, preventing us from being content with what is said. Sound makes time visible, explains Levinas who quotes a poem by Pouchkine untitled 揟he prophet, a poem which describes how our hearing may become attentive to the being of things. Sound is the presence of what is not here, of what I can抰 receive in myself as a part of myself. In that sense it testifies to an exteriority that I can抰 thematize. Sound is not a name, it抯 a verb, or a symbol. But what is really new with 搕he symbolic value of expression accomplished within sound? It抯 the newness of the Other, of what I can抰 reduce to a theme or a Said. 揚hilosophy itself is identified with the substitution of ideas for persons, the theme for the interlocutor, the interiority of the logical relation for the exteriority of interpellation. Existents are reduced to the neuter state of the idea, the concept Being ( ). But Levinas is looking for a method which will give the Other all his/her 揼lory () and this word 揼lory will remain important in his later books. It does not point out to a sudden light or honor but rather, according to the Hebrew meaning of the word, to the weight of something I may never include in myself, of a transcendence that calls me but remains invisible. Even when it is a 搒till small voice (I Kings 19, 12) as the one heard by Elijah, such a sound helps getting out of oneself. Levinas will not pursue this phenomenology of sound in his books but in Totality and Infinity he will describe how the face of the other testifies to a first signification that I can抰 integrate within myself. And this precise first signification - described as a verb, a calling to me, a Saying - will become the necessary orientation of all the other significations, philosophical significations included of course.In another lecture given in 1950, Teachings (Les Enseignements)Levinas goes deeper on that matter, he compares it to the relation between a master and a pupil and also - which is our main purpose in this paper - to the question of books. Why is teaching so crucial for him? First because contrary to Sartre抯 existentialism which was very influential at that time, Levinas does not think being a created being is a drama, he rather sees it as an election or as a first passivity that does not contradict freedom (Sartre抯 thesis) but requires an education. Since a drama may occur at any time between all those who are elected (see Cain and Abel), every creature, every elected being needs an education. Education will help a real fraternity be achieved among elected creatures, because it will point out the uniqueness of each one. This rather optimistic levinasian view just after the Second World War also means that we have to open books anew and especially the Jewish texts and to discover how they may become a source for a renewed life, for a renewed interiority. The second reason (why teaching is important) is that books call for other books, 揵ut such a proliferation of written words stops or culminates when the live word (parole vivante) filters into them, when critique turns into teaching. And then, once more there are books (). Books are not enough as long as they miss the master抯 voice, or the father抯 voice as Levinas specifies. Such a voice is not an authoritarian one, it announces to every one that he/she is responsible for the fragility of what is written. This responsibility for the books, for their meanings being discovered and remaining alive, is described in similar terms as is the responsibility for the Other. Election is not a privilege, it抯 the discovery of this responsibility, but one has to listen to the master抯 or to the father抯 voice so as to discover it. When I hear the voice of a master, even the humblest one, I discover this responsibility that comes to me from an absolute past. Now this is a key point as regards the reading of books. In a lecture delivered two years latter (1952) and untitled The written word and the oral word (L扙crit et l扥ral), Levinas explains that the living word - the word told to another person - is necessary for those who have the premonition that if books have something to tell them it also means they have something to ask from them as unique persons. When such a requirement disappears, especially because we prefer a solitary erudition and a silent knowledge, we forget our own responsibility as a reader of books. As I have already mentioned Plato used to say that once it抯 separated from the oral word of the person who wrote them, books become orphans and that抯 why he was in favor of the oral word only. Levinas argues that in our modernity we have the necessary tools to prevent - or try to prevent - such a danger: philology for instance must help us find again what the author really meant to say. Philology - and other scientific disciplines - want to decipher this first intention. They sometimes succeed and sometimes fail but, in any case, they miss what Levinas here calls the author抯 揺xpression (as opposed to his/her intention). A reader who is looking for the truth that the writer was trying to express (later on Levinas will speak of the power to say of his/her words) does not try to reconstitute the writer抯 so called intention. The truth expressed is greater than his/her intention, and it抯 a Saying (not a Said), a Saying that is calling us 揻rom a centre which is outside of ourselves (), and will remain always outside of ourselves. 揈xpression does not consist in giving us the Other抯 interiority, 搕he Other who expresses himself precisely does not give himself but expression is the essence of language (). How can we pay attention to expression when reading books? A scientific interpretation tries to discover what the writers wanted to say, who may have had an influence on them etc. Levinas says it抯 as though it was considering them as 揵arbarian, as people who do not express anything, who do not demand something from us. When we want to listen to their expression, we have to begin discussing with them and answer their questions. We have to give back their importance to the voice and to the dialogue: dialogue with the voices of the past and dialogue with the voices of the present. We have to go to school and encounter a master or face a face. This is most difficult since 搕he daily speech and the insufficient speech of teachers who are not masters, are already written words. Teachers who only teach us what they know although they might be excellent teachers are not masters. 揑t抯 only when a master speaks that his thought has a face (), or better said here an expression that makes us responsible for it. A master is not 揳 mid-wife that helps the disciples cleverness grow as in the Socratic view. He/she does not impose on the pupils his/her knowledge or reasons, rather he/she orientates them toward this absolute past I mentioned a while ago. Toward a centre which never appears but which calls them. A master in Levinas抯 view orientates me toward the trace of the Infinite, of God who reveals Himself 搃n speaking. This God transcends all the gods of paganism, not because He is a better God, but because He wants me to answer my neighbour抯 (or pupil抯 or master抯) calling. That抯 precisely why oral teaching prevails over writing teaching.In a note published in the first book of his In閐its () Levinas explains that what we call a 揵ookish knowledge is what has not been taught in an oral way by a master. He emphasises this importance of the oral teaching which is inseparable from the written teaching. A real master is not the one who delivers the pupil抯 spirit but the one that the pupils are always questioning. Levinas reminds us that the Talmudic discussions are pluralistic discussions because the Talmudic sages knew that truth has a dialectical structure. That抯 also why every society must be eager to have schools where it抯 possible to encounter masters - and not only books - to listen to their voices and to ask them questions. According to the philosopher schools are 搕he point of Archimedes of true freedom (), schools are the place where books are always opened, the place where we don抰 use books but where they speak to us because we ask them questions.When we study the Torah, the Book that has inspired so many books, while paying attention to the voice that is calling us we don抰 discuss the verses from an historico-critical point of view, although it might be most important in certain circumstances. In the In閐its, Levinas even assumes that 揓udaism is invulnerable to the biblical critic because what counts is that the writings we now read, although they might have been written latter than the sages claim, have been meditated and elaborated for centuries by oral tradition and by consciences that were 搇ucid and total(). In any case, when we study the Torah now we still try to discover what new significations (hidoushim) might be expressed in the language of the verses. And it抯 not enough to discover them silently while studying alone, one has to tell them to someone else, to address them to another person and to listen to this other person抯 questions. In the book of Leviticus (1, 1-2) it抯 said: 揂nd the Lord called unto Moses and spake unto him out of the Tabernacle of the congregation saying: Speak unto the children of Israel and say unto them厰 In his commentary Rachi explains that it was the Lord抯 voice that was heard by Moses and although 搕he voice of the Lord is powerful and 揻ull of majesty (Ps 29, 4), the people could not hear it. Only Moses paid attention to it. Now this voice was speaking unto him 揻rom off the mercy seat that was upon the ark of the testimony, from between the two cherubims (Numbers 7, 89). In his commentary to the latter verse, Rachi writes that the voice could have been heard by anybody since it was speaking to itself (midaber= mitdaber) (Hitpael), but such was not the case, only Moses heard it as though it was speaking to him. This is precisely how a person while listening to well known verses may, from time to time, hear them as though they were speaking anew to him/her now and asking from him/her to express something new about them to other people. A reader has to remain all ears since he/she never knows exactly when he/she will hear the voice calling him/her. Such are the ways of election, it抯 always a surprise, but no one is elected by the voice before one answers its calling. The voice and what is written in books are inseparable. According to the Jewish tradition at least, books are meant to answer this 搗oice of the words (Kol devarim) (Dt 4, 12). This voice was the unique 搕hing that the people could see at Mount Sinai (zoulati kol). And Levinas抯 thesis about the expression 揳ll the people see the voices (roim et haKolot) (Ex 20, 18) is that the voice has become a written expression that one has already to interpret. But if such is the case, the Voice needs the voices - very carnal voices - of its witnesses so as to be heard now. Although 搕he Infinite does not appear to him that bears witness to it, 搕he witness belongs to the glory of the Infinite. It is by the voice of the witness that the glory of the Infinite is glorified ().Now if some books have no lively posterity it抯 because the readers want to substitute their own voices to the Voice, they refuse to testify to it. But once the voice has become a book it can抰 prevent bad interpretations, it抯 powerless. When readers argue they have the only right interpretation of a verse, when they try to imprison the Saying within the boundaries of their own Said, even if they argue they have received a direct inspiration from God, one must not pay attention to them. We may recall here the famous story in the Talmud when it抯 said that although R. Eliezer had the support of a divine voice (a bat Kol) he could not win in the discussion with his colleagues since the Torah is no longer 搃n heaven (Dt 30, 12), no divine voice may decide what is right and what is wrong (). According to this story God said that his children (the rabbis) were right in not agreeing with R.Eliezer since the Torah was no longer in heaven, they had only to listen to human voices interpreting it. Emmanuel Levinas agrees with such an idea since for him also God抯 word may be heard within the boundaries of human words. The Infinite contracted Itself within the Torah which in consequence gets an infinite density. If we want to discover a little of what this infinite density means we have to interpret the verses again and again and transmit our hidoushim to our pupils or our friends. Yet many people, especially philosophers, remain unable to interpret the Torah because they can抰 揹ecipher a writing hidden in a palimpsest (), they can抰 decipher the 揺xpression of the Hebrew language because most of the time they have no knowledge of it. They forget the voice hidden in the Scripture and it remains in exile within the written words. Levinas wants us to open our Jewish books anew and discover how their expression is calling every one of us and also renewing our own interiority. 3 The discovery of one抯 own psyche.There is one last question to be discussed briefly: was does Levinas really mean when he points out that was 搃s written in souls is at first written in books as I mentioned in my introduction? Why does he think that when books are in danger our own psyche is in danger too? His answer - and there are many expressions of it in his works - is as follows: 搘ithout an extreme attention to the Book of the books, one can抰 listen to his/her conscience. Books prevent spirituality from being outshined by mere cleverness or knowledge (), they are necessary 搕o give new priority to the inner life or to 搕he true inner life which means a life that does not rely on institutions. After the Shoah, Levinas was very anxious about the new generation抯 spiritual fate and he wanted the surviving Jews to 搕each the new generation the strength necessary to be strong in isolation, and all that a fragile consciousness is called upon to contain at such times. Now, for that purpose, one had to open the Jewish books anew ( ). This consciousness has to be strong especially because civilizations and institutions may be destroyed or become perverse, as it happened during the war. Therefore morality has to be known and justified 搃n the fragility of the conscience, in the 揻our cubits of the Halakhah, in that precarious, divine abode. Such is Judaism, 揾umanity on the brink of morality without institutions ().May we go deeper onto that matter? If what is written in our souls is indeed first written in books, it is also because books - the Torah and the oral tradition that elucidates its expressions but also the great national literatures that were inspired by it - help us discover what remains hidden in our soul. The interpretation of the verses turns out to be a spiritual voyage, a voyage that Israel as a people and every person among them, even the humblest ones, are supposed to undertake. No one may engage in a real voyage on behalf of someone else because it抯 dependent upon each person抯 deepest questions, questions that arise from his/her own life. Whether they have their roots in our anxiety and our suffering or in our joy and our gratefulness, these questions have an extraordinary power: they help us discover new significations hidden within the expression of the verses and these significations are not verified by any objective erudition but by one抯 own life. It抯 not only a private affair since Levinas holds that if one person does not participate in this elucidation, aspects of the Revelation remain waiting to be discovered. The four traditional levels of interpretation of the Torah- literal, allusive, metaphoric and secret (pschat, remez, drash and sod) - are meant to open our understanding of the Hebrew expressions of the text. The Jewish mystics say that God who inspired these expressions is hidden within them, and they look upon these expressions as though they were God抯 garments. But one must add something else: these four levels of interpretations are also qualifications of our psyche. We sometimes prefer to stop short and refuse to go deeper than a literal (pshat) interpretation of our own soul. We fear the worst that might always happen during such a voyage and we wrongly believe certitudes and dogmas - about the Torah and about ourselves - are a safe haven.Although it抯 always a personal adventure, this voyage is never a lonely one. It抯 orientated by a constant encounter and dialogue with the masters of past times - the oral Torah - and such an encounter and such a dialogue are similar to the ones we have with our best friends: friends who share with us the enigma of existence and wonder about its meaning. Such an encounter is a demanding one and it抯 not free from hard conflicts but it抯 necessary for it prevents us from going astray which might happen when we think we don抰 need to share our point of view with anybody. This discussion is also what prevents the multiplicity of interpretations from becoming mere relativism, it places it within one tradition. Levinas says: such a discussion helps us discover not the unity of the source of the Scripture but 搕he marvelousness of the confluence of what it抯 written. We must trust 搕he sages wisdom and discuss with them. 揟his confidence may be looked upon as a faith, but this faith that we declare is the only one that we don抰 have to keep quietly for ourselves. It抯 not a shameless profession of faith like the ones that are loudly published in such an indiscrete way in all public places (). Now may those who undertake this voyage within the Book and within themselves, remaining in a constant dialogue with the voices of the masters and of their pupils, also hope to hear the voice of 揌e who spoke and things came to existence? Where and when do we hear such a voice? As most readers of Levinas know the philosopher maintains that we hear this voice - the voice of the Infinite - when we answer our neighbour抯 face urging us to be responsible for him/her. But I want to underline here, in my conclusion, that Levinas always describes the verses as though they were faces calling for our responsibility. The voice of the Infinite may be heard when we answer this calling also. What is supposed to be written in our souls - for instance 揟hou shalt not kill (Ex 20, 13) - is first written in a book but the voice who orders us to take care of our neighbour is also the very voice that orders us to take care of the books. Now in both cases this voice can抰 compel us to answer in a positive way, it抯 up to us not to let the voice disappear. Catherine Chalier.Emmanuel Levinas, Ethique et Infini, Paris, Fayard, 1982, p. 15-16. Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo, translated by Richard Cohen, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburg, 185, p. 21-22. Ibid., p. 125-126; p. 116-117. (I underline). Emmanuel Levinas, Pr閒ace R.Ha飉 de Volozin, L掆me de la vie, translation Benno Gross, Lagrasse, Verdier, 1986, p. VIII. Emmanuel Levinas, 珷 Les cordes et le bois牷 in Hors sujet, Montpellier, Fata Morgana, 1987, p. 192 and p. 193; 珷The Strings and the Wood牷 in Outside the Subject, translated by Michael B.Smith, London, The Athlone Press, 1993, p. 126 and p. 128. Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l抙istoire, (1941), p. 27 and p.40, r殫dit in L抙istoire, la guerre, la r閟istance, Paris, Collection Quarto, Gallimard, 2006. Emmanuel Levinas, Hors sujet, p. 192-193; Outside the subject, p. 127. Totalit et Infini, La Haye, Nijhoff, 1961, poche p. 34; Totality and Infinity, translation Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne Press University, Pittsburg, 1969, p. 43. Ibid., p. 87; translation p.88. See Levinas, Parole et Silence et autres conf閞ences in閐ites, 寀vres 2, sous la responsabilit de Rodolphe Calin et Catherine Chalier, Paris, Grasset/Imec, 2009, p. 90. Ibid., Les enseignements, p. 187. Ibid., p. 212. Totalit et Infini, p. 221; Totality and Infinity, p. 202. Ibid., p. 217 and p.226. See Carnets de captivit et autres in閐its, 寀vres, t.1, sous la responsabilit de Rodolphe Calin et de Catherine Chalier, Paris, Grasset/Imec, 2009, A. 5, p. 254-255. Ibid., A. 156, p. 314. Ibid., A. 2, p. 254. Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu掙tre ou au-del de l抏ssence, La Haye, Nijhoff, 1974, poche p.229; Otherwise than being, translated by Alphonso Lingis, La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1981, p. 146. See, T.Babli, Baba Metsia 59b. Emmanuel Levinas, Humanisme de l抋utre homme, Montpellier, Fata Morgana, 1972, p.96; Collected Philosophical Papers, translated by Alphonso Lingis, La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, p.148. See Entretien avec Fran鏾is Poirier, Emmanuel Levinas. Qui 阾es-vous? Lyon, Ed. La Manufacture, 1987, p. 125 and p.67: books are 珷the essence of spirituality牷 Noms propres, 珷Sans nom牷, Montpellier, Fata Morgana, 1976, p. 180; Proper names, 珷Nameless牷, translated by Michael B.Smith, Standford University Press, p. 122. Ibid. p. 182 and p. 181; p.123 and p.122. 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O A  $$$'0 Hg粎d醍1灤A[]_`bcefg7,v棲$A\^adh  '!!晙餞  # 咥臕@饞 0(  養 S  ?餒0(  _GoBack4B4B!04>E} !#$&'2<B!%=@Iv} !#$&'2<B3b} !#$&'2<BB 4 2筓Wj_v [3H込~@繯A@Unknown G* Times New Roman5Symbol3. * Arial;. * HelveticaEgApple ChanceryO oAmerican Typewriter7燢@Cambria;媅SOSimSunG5  狖hMS Mincho-3 fgA犽 BCambria Math 1鸚鷵圍囼ug@>S&DX:!?!%),.:;>?]}    & 0 2 3 : !6"000 0 0 0000006:>兀﨑 =@\]^$([{  0 0 000000Y;[hh+盧:HP$P筓W2! xxAnnette Aronowiczju儽傢V鄥燆鵒h珣+'遲0p  0 < H T`hpxAnnette AronowiczNormal 番茄花園2Microsoft Office Word@F#@@酐q <@酐q <@>G樺tz 鋟 &" WMFC2 純跡l^it EMF跡 !鑘   ^i% % Rp@Times New Roman \塋RQ`2\T 匿@$Q`2\T Id/1T\ /衐/1XG* Times ew Roman躝堛8'1你你鑨%1煦/dv% % %   TTN@髏嘆崊嘆N)L^iP K!^i" !B TT@髏嘆崊嘆)LBP12TT髏嘆崊嘆)LBP K!B" "  % % %  TTNN髏嘆崊嘆NL^iP K TTN2髏嘆崊嘆NL^iP KRp@"Helvetica\塋RQ`2\T匿@$Q`2\T Id/1T\ 7衐/1X;.* Helvetcap燻2鞂譜6萂堛8'1你你鑨%1煦 7dv% % %  % % % TTN6y髏嘆崊嘆NL^iP ,TTz6髏嘆崊嘆zL^iP ,TT6髏嘆崊嘆L^iP ,TT6髏嘆崊嘆L^iP ,Rp@ HelveticaT歌8RQ`2歌板 滆$Q`2歌板 Id/1板歌 5衐/1X;.* Helvetcap燻2垔譜5溴8'1  鑨%1H5dv% % % % % % T6} 髏嘆崊嘆L^iThe voice and the book>781828788787882'% Ld} !??% ( TT~ 6 髏嘆崊嘆~ L^iP.TT 6 髏嘆崊嘆 L^iP K TTN髏嘆崊嘆NL^iP K TTN髏嘆崊嘆NvL^iP K TTNy髏嘆崊嘆NL^iP ,Tx[髏嘆崊嘆zL^ilAccording to C228!88745754T\F髏嘆崊嘆\6L^iEmmanuel Levinas when we search for what best CSS88784588188245G87845G855278!28448!44G8855782 TpNFq髏嘆崊嘆N\[L^icharacterises a human being, we should not think, as Aristotle did, of his/her 288!828!282 8 87S88 8887 G8 28888 88 882 82 C!278 88 7 8278! TNuF髏嘆崊嘆N_L^i ability to think in a rational way but of his/her openness to books, of his/her 881888288!8888G818888288!8787882288882278278  TNW髏嘆崊嘆NBL^ilability to rea8818!88TFW髏嘆崊嘆BGL^id them. He was once asked:  How does one begin thinking? and 778SH8G82882882287!H8G88828787878882878!878 TLN[G髏嘆崊嘆NUL^ihe answered:  It probably begins through traumatisms or gropings to which 88%%882G8!88%!%%%8 88781%%88782%%8!8878%%!88S81T2%%8!%%7"88872%%8%%G829 ThNF=髏嘆崊嘆N(ZL^ione does not know how to give a verbal form: a separation, a violent scene, 887788178278G88G8718818!888 T72788!7888188822788 TNA4髏嘆崊嘆N L^i`a sudden 8"#287878"TT5AW髏嘆崊嘆5L^iP #TXAF髏嘆崊嘆XML^iconsciousness of the monotony of time. It is from the reading of 278228817822"#7"#78""T878781#"7#"T7"#"#2""!7T"#78"#!87887"#7 TxN#髏嘆崊嘆NL^i\books 8882223TT#髏嘆崊嘆L^iP-!TXE#髏嘆崊嘆L^iP 33TF &" WMFC 糲跡#髏嘆崊嘆FL^inot necessary philosophical 87337828128!1338882888183TT  #髏嘆崊嘆 L^iP-!TX _ #髏嘆崊嘆 L^iP 33T0` F#髏嘆崊嘆` &L^ithat these initial shocks become 88337828238832288222328827S7 T|N'F髏嘆崊嘆N]L^iquestions and problems giving one to think. The role of national literatures is 78828828788!887T271878888882>78 887887888!78!822 TdN 髏嘆崊嘆NL^iThere88!8TXS 髏嘆崊嘆L^iP T\TF 髏嘆崊嘆TXL^iperhaps very important. Not just that one learns words from it, but in it 78!888118!1T88!88H8827887888!81G8!82!7T878 TN E| 髏嘆崊嘆Ng `L^i one lives  the true life which is absent , but which is no longer utopian. 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Indeed, to read is to keep oneself abov7!"88 "8887"!87887""8!"!878!"2!"7""1887""78818!"8781T H 髏嘆崊嘆 3 L^ipe the realism 8"!87"!!882T!"TT H 髏嘆崊嘆3 L^iP-!TX H 髏嘆崊嘆3 L^iP !"T FH 髏嘆崊嘆3 L^i`or the 8!!"77 TNL  髏嘆崊嘆N L^i`politics 8822.TTL  髏嘆崊嘆 L^iP 8TTL  髏嘆崊嘆 L^iP -TL E 髏嘆崊嘆 HL^iof our care for ourselves, without coming however to the good 7-.88!-.28 8.-8!..78!28182.G888..27T87.-88G828!..7..88-.7887 TN F. 髏嘆崊嘆N ^L^iintentions of beautiful souls, or to the normative idealism of what  must be . In 88888278788827828!78788 T8188881T7G88S82888Rp@"Helvetic&" WMFC 糃跡a,愨RQ`2愨堖t$Q`2愨堖 Id/1堖愨 8衐/1X;.* Helvetcap燻2鞍譜7K殲8'1鑨%1 8dv% % % % % %  % % % TxN2 P 髏嘆崊嘆N 2L^ithis sense, the Bible would be for me the 822782878C88G888888!T878TQ 2 C 髏嘆崊嘆Q L^i|book par excellence ( 888178!81288828 !% % % !^i% % % TTD" hl 髏嘆崊嘆D^ LP1啄%" % % % TXi2  髏嘆崊嘆i L^iP).!TT2  髏嘆崊嘆 L^iP 穳K % % % TTN y 髏嘆崊嘆N L^iP },Tz  髏嘆崊嘆z >L^iLevinas s meditation on the importance of books for a 8818822/T88888/.88//88//T78!7828./8//78822/.8!//8//% % % Tl 0 髏嘆崊嘆 L^iXhuman88R88% % % TX1  髏嘆崊嘆1 L^iP //Tp F 髏嘆崊嘆 L^iXlife 8 TN E 髏嘆崊嘆Nr ^L^iremains a main feature of his philosophy till the end of his life. After he had !8T882 8 T87787!8 7 82 88818881  88 888 7 82 8 B8! 78 787 TN  髏嘆崊嘆N ;L^idiscovered and described the responsibility for the 朲822818!88 788 8822 888 87 !82788281 8! 87 T G 髏嘆崊嘆 L^iother in a completely new 788! 8 8 28S8881 78H TXN Gm髏嘆崊嘆NXWL^iphilosophical way, after he had described human subjectivity as inhabited by R888287828##G91##88!##88##888##8822!778#87T88##2788212$#82##888878##82 TtNqF髏嘆崊嘆N\L^ithe other and  the human as a breakthrough that occurs in being , he turns to 88878!878!8778T788188!8828!7878878228!287887!888 827 T`N S髏嘆崊嘆N>.L^ithe question of books again.  I have spo88((788288('7(87812((8788((!((8818((388T8 FS髏嘆崊嘆 >'L^iken of Scripture and the Book. I 278((7((C2!88!8('888((78((C881( TLNWG髏嘆崊嘆NUL^ithought of their firmness which already tightens, hard as a verse, in all Kz88878..7..88!.-!T8822..G828..8!8871..78882.88!8..82-8..18!28..8..8 % % % TNV8髏嘆崊嘆N#IL^ilanguages, before becoming letters traced by a stylus or quill. ~88788782 878!8 8728T87 88!2 !8287 81! 8 2182! 8! !78 % % % TWF9髏嘆崊嘆W#L^ipWhat one calls 傴_88 878 281 % % % THN<髏嘆崊嘆N*L^iwritten in souls is at first written I!88 8 2882 2 8 !2 I!88 TT<髏嘆崊嘆L^iP 苴 T<d 髏嘆崊嘆 L^i`in books.8 88812% % % TXe < 髏嘆崊嘆e L^iP T8 <F髏嘆崊嘆 'L^iTheir status has always been too 沔>78! 2882 882 8G912 8888 77 TPNF髏嘆崊嘆N VL^iquickl&" WMFC #跡y made commonplace among the tools or cultural products of Nature of 78221!!T787!!18ST788827! 8S887 !78 !782!8! !288!8 !8!87812! 7 !H88!8 7 T,N#U髏嘆崊嘆N}PL^iHistory (& ) I think that across all literature the human face speaks H28!1++!d!++*+881*+78+*82!822**8++8!88!7+*87*+78S87+*728*+278821+TTV#髏嘆崊嘆V}L^iP 7TT#髏嘆崊嘆}L^iP O+Td#F髏嘆崊嘆}L^iTor 8  T Nx髏嘆崊嘆N L^istammers, or gives itself a c28ST8!28!71822881Ty髏嘆崊嘆y4L^iountenance, or struggles with its caricature . 8787888187!2!87782H8218!288!8!TT髏嘆崊嘆L^iP K TTN yx髏嘆崊嘆NcL^iP ?,T4x Fx髏嘆崊嘆zcQL^iAmong all books, Levinas gives a special status to the Bible, to the W餋T787&%8&78822%&871882&&7182&&7&&18828&&1882%&8%&78%&C78%&7%&78 TPN|E髏嘆崊嘆NVL^iBook of Books, or to the Holy Scriptures, not because they have a sacred C882#$7$C7822$#8!$$8$$88#$H81$$C2!88!72$$78$#8818827$$781$$8818$#8$$182!87 T N]^髏嘆崊嘆NI#L^iorigin but because they signify^8!78((88('8827828''881((2781TX^^髏嘆崊嘆^IL^iP ((TxF^髏嘆崊嘆I2L^i through the expression of the face of the !8!8877((87((818!82287((7'(88''818('7(88% % %  % % % T Nb}髏嘆崊嘆N#L^iother man that they illuminate (?888!--S88-88--781--8T888!!% % % !^i% % % TT~R髏嘆崊嘆~LP2撪%" % % % ThbG髏嘆崊嘆/L^i) and also because they awaken in their ~!-888--828--8827828--781--8G8288--8--88" TPNFD髏嘆崊嘆N/VL^ireaders so many new interpretations of their meaning. This multiplicity of !8888!2*+27*+S881+*78G++88!8!88782*+7++88!*+S87887*+=82+*T8821++7 T NH|髏嘆崊嘆N#L^iinterpretations is indeed insepa齷88!8!88882./2//78878//82788Tl}HF髏嘆崊嘆}0L^irable from what a book is for Levinas, and !788/. 8T/G88.8/7882/2/.8!//881882/.878 TNE*髏嘆崊嘆N^L^iespecially in the case of the Bible: one has to interpret it but one has also 8288281 8 88 1818 7 88 C88 788 882 8 88!8!7  78 878 782 827 T0N.髏嘆崊嘆N&L^ito let it interpret one s life. 8878!8!878828TT.髏嘆崊嘆L^iP o咾 TTNy髏嘆崊嘆NL^iP 鈁,Tz髏嘆崊嘆zJL^iYet, if a book needs to be interpreted, it also means the lonelB8$$$$8$$8782$$87872$$8$$88$$88!8!787$$$$828$$T8782$$88$888T|F髏嘆崊嘆L^i\y and 1$$887 TDNF髏嘆&" WMFC 跡崊嘆NnTL^isilent words written on a piece of parchment, on paper or on an electronic 288**G8!82*+H!88**88*8*8828**7**78!28T78**78*8878!**8!**88*88*881!881 T4NF髏嘆崊嘆NQL^idevice, remain powerless once written. They can t impose a meaning on ?88128++!8T88++88G8!822++8828++G!88*+>781++288++T7828*+8++S88887++77 Rp@Times New RomanP 撮4RQ`2撮 橀$Q`2撮 Id/1撮 L;衐/1XG* Times ew Romanpc噫8'1鑨%1DL;dv% % % % % % !^iT<N5s髏嘆崊嘆N\(L T|6s髏嘆崊嘆6\L\ " '% LdNBFNB!??% ( % % % TTHs髏嘆崊嘆\L^iP 苞KRp@Times New Roman冗 ,RQ`2,$ 斸$Q`2,$ Id/1$, l=衐/1XG* Times ew Roman躘X8'1斷斷鑨%1監l=dv% % % % % % Rp@"Helvetica\塋RQ`2\T匿@$Q`2\T Id/1T\ \<衐/1X;.* Helvetcap燻2鞂譜<<淚堛8'1你你鑨%1煦\<dv% % % Rp @"Helvetica\塋RQ`2\T匿@$Q`2\T Id/1T\ 衐/1X;.* Helvetcap燻2鞂譜| 碸堛8'1你你鑨%1煦 dv% % %  % % % !^i% % % TTNeo髏嘆崊嘆NLP1"" % % % Tp髏嘆崊嘆pL^itEmmanuel Levinas, 7FG....%%..*..*%%% % % T髏嘆崊嘆L^ixEthique et Infini, 7....%%.%%..%%% % % T- 髏嘆崊嘆L^iParis, Fayard, 1982, p. 15\|7.*%%3/(/.%%./..%%.%/.TT. I 髏嘆崊嘆. L^iP-:TlJ 髏嘆崊嘆J L^iX16. ┸..%%% % % T?髏嘆崊嘆L^i|Ethics and Infinity, 8.**%%...%%..* % % % TN>F髏嘆崊嘆N5eL^iConversations with Philippe Nemo, translated by Richard Cohen, Duquesne University Press, 糴<./).*...*<.7//..=.G...*./.0(<*...<./..<./..*/.</*.*(7.*+ TNJd髏嘆崊嘆NL^i|Pittsburg, 185, p. 217*/..../...TTeJ髏嘆崊嘆eL^iP-準T`J髏嘆崊嘆L^iT22./.TTJ@髏嘆崊嘆L^iP [OK% % % % % %  % % % !^i% % % TTNo髏嘆崊嘆NLP2k"" % % % Txp:髏嘆崊嘆pL^i\Ibid., ./% % % Tp;"髏嘆崊嘆;L^iXp. 125../.TT#>髏嘆崊嘆#L^iP-硾T`?髏嘆崊嘆?L^iT126v...TT髏嘆崊嘆L^iP T|髏嘆崊嘆L^i\; p. 116../.TT髏嘆崊嘆L^iP-嶠T髏嘆崊嘆L^ix117. (I underline).餠/..../...TT 髏嘆崊嘆L^iP [餕% % 6i6^i6^66h6]h6]66g6\g6\66f6[f6[66e6Ze6Z66d6Yd6Y66c6Xc6X66&WMFC跡b6Wb6W66a6Va6V6 6 `6U`6U 6  6 _6T_6T 6  6 ^6S^6S 6  6 ]6R]6R 6  6 \6Q\6Q 6 6[6P[6P66Z6OZ6O66Y6NY6N66X6MX6M66W6LW6L6  H."System--@Times New Roman---  2 ndG ,H',s_ 2 n_s1 2 n_s ,s_''---  2 sdG  2 dG @"Helvetica------ 2 dG 3 2 G 2 2 G 3 2 G 3@ Helvetica------22 /GThe voice and the book      - @ !/- 2 G. 2 G  2 dG  2 dG  2 dG 3"2 GAccording to     \2 6GEmmanuel Levinas when we search for what best        2 d[Gcharacterises a human being, we should not think, as Aristotle did, of his/her o                         2 d_Gability to think in a rational way but of his/her openness to books, of his/her                     #2 dGability to rea   v2 GGd them. He was once asked: 揌ow does one begin thinking? and                2 #dUGhe answered: It probably begins through traumatisms or gropings to which                   2 6dZGone does not know how to give a verbal form: a separation, a violent scene,                    2 Jd Ga sudden   2 JG 2 JMGconsciousness of the monotony of time. It is from the reading of k              2 ]dGbooks 6   2 ]G-2 ]G 82 ]Gnot necessary philosophical         2 ]G-2 ]G D2 ]&Gthat these initial shocks become              2 qd]Gquestions and problems giving one to think. The role of national literatures is                       2 dGhere  2 G 2 XGperhaps very important. Not just that one learns words from it, but in it                 2 d`Gone lives 憈he true life which is absent, but which is no longer utopian. I think                    t2 dFGthat in the great fear of bookishness, one underestimates the                2 }G "2 G憃ntological     2 dPGreference of the human to the book that one takes for a source of                       @"Helvetica------Y2 d4Ginformation, or for a 憈ool of learning, a              ---2 Gtextbook  ---52 G, even though it is a     ---2 Gmodality  --- 2 G h2 d>Gof our being. Indeed, to read is to keep oneself abov             %2 'Ge the realism     2 G-2 G 2  Gor the   2 d Gpolitics    2 G 2 G w2 HGof our care for ourselves, without coming however to the good                2 d^Gintentions of beautiful souls, or to the normative idealism of what 憁ust be. In                    @"Helvetica---------V2 d2Gthis sense, the Bible would be for me the             .2 Gbook par excellence(     ---,H--- 2 j1'---2 qG). 2 {G --- 2 3dG 3h2 3>GLevinas抯 meditation on the importance of books for a              ---2 3Ghumani  ---2 3G 2 3Glife  2 Gd^Gremains a main feature of his philosophy till the end of his life. After he had                         d2 [d;Gdiscovered and described the responsibility for the a               :2 [ Gother in a completely new          2 ndWGphilosophical way, after he had described human subjectivity as inhabited by                   2 d\Gthe other and 搕he human as a breakthrough that occurs in being, he turns to                         P2 d.Gthe question of books again. 揑 have spo           F2 'Gken of Scripture and the Book. I          2 dUGthought of their firmness which already tightens, hard as a verse, in all                    ---y2 dIGlanguages, before becoming letters traced by a stylus or quill.                ---%2 nGWhat one calls     ---J2 d*Gwritten in souls is at first written          2 sG 2 y Gin books.   ---2 G F2 'GTheir status has always been too         2 dVGquickly made commonplace among the tools or cultural products of Nature of                         2 dPGHistory () I think that across all literature the human face speaks                   2 G 2 G 2 Gor ;2 d Gstammers, or gives itself a c       Y2 D4Gountenance, or struggles with its caricature.              2 G  2 dG 32 QGAmong all books, Levinas gives a special status to the Bible, to the                     2 1dVGBook of Books, or to the Holy Scriptures, not because they have a sacred                    @2 Dd#Gorigin but because they signify         2 DkG V2 Dx2G搕hrough the expression of the face of the             ------@2 Xd#Gother man that they illuminate(        ---,H--- 2 Pp2'---R2 Xw/G) and also because they awaken in their          2 kdVGreaders so many new interpretations of their meaning. This multiplicity of                    @2 d#Ginterpretations is indeed insepa        S2 p0Grable from what a book is for Levinas, and           2 d^Gespecially in the case of the Bible: one has to interpret it but one has also                      D2 d&Gto let it interpret one抯 life.           2 FG  2 dG 3z2 JGYet, if a book needs to be interpreted, it also means the lonel                2 Gy and  2 dTGsilent words written on a piece of parchment, on paper or on an electronic                        2 dQGdevice, remain powerless once written. They can抰 impose a meaning on c                   @Times New Roman------,HC2 d( 2   '- @ !d---- 2 /G @Times New Roman------@"Helvetica- - - @"Helvetica- - - ---,H--- 2 d1'- - - )2 jGEmmanuel Levinas, - - - ,2 GEthique et Infini, - - - 72 }GParis, Fayard, 1982, p. 15  2 ;G-2 @G16. - - - /2 `GEthics and Infinity, - - - 2 deGConversations with Philippe Nemo, translated by Richard Cohen, Duquesne University Press,          .2 *dGPittsburg, 185, p. 21  2 *G-2 *G22.  2 *G ---- - - ---,H--- 2 5d2'- - - 2 <jGIbid., - - - 2 <Gp. 125 2 <G-2 <G1261 2 <G 2 <G; p. 116 2 <G-+2 <G117. (I underline).2 2 <~G --GGGGGGGGGGGGFFFFFFFFFFFFEEEEEEEEEEEEDD脹諟.摋+,0 X`lt| &S+   !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghiklmnopqstuvwxyz{|}~Root Entry F犚}v <Data j1TablerWordDocument0SummaryInformation(犿DocumentSummaryInformation8CompObju  F#Microsoft Office Word 97-2003 文檔 MSWordDocWord.Document.89瞦