邢唷> 欹兠 嫉bjbjv觱 0汐9"   8VdDC,,o! f  fffR  ffff翞濐斠ff0Cffff f@fC :   The logic of collective identities1. Identity talk 2. Two meanings of the word 珷identity牷 3. From logic to moral psychology 4. The logic of proper names 5. Social identities 6. Collective identities 7. Self-defining communities : a criterion of identity for a polis (Aristotle, Politics, Book III) 8. The semantics of 搘e 9. Real collective identities 1. Identity talk Collective identities is a topic many today will take as being deeply problematic. Sometimes, it is claimed that we should avoid even using the term 揷ollective identity, the reason being that 搃dentity talk leads to identity politics, and that identity politics is divisive and mystifying. Divisive because it suggests that individuals should define themselves through their communitarian links rather than through universal values and goals shared by everybody. Mystifying because it suggest that communities have a reality over and above their individual members. Invoking collective identities, according to that view, is a way of diverting people from their real interests and their real fights. This last objection suggests that what is at stake is the very legitimacy of the notion of 揷ollective identity. Collective identities, it is argued, are not just objectionable on political and ethical grounds, they are conceptually problematic. Then what is first needed is a conceptual clarification. Therefore I will discuss the notion of collective identities from a logical point of view. 2. Two meanings of the word 珷identity牷 Before coming to my topic proper the logic of collective identities -, we need to make clear what we are talking about. I will begin by pointing to an ambiguity of the word 搃dentity as it is used today. Let抯 say we see people doing the same thing, e.g. speaking their own language (the same one) or going to their church (the same one). This would be a matter of ascertaining identity in the logical sense of referring to one and the same thing. In my examples: the same language, the same church. Now, let抯 suppose these people are deeply attached to their language or to their rituals. If you asked them to change their ways (say, for reasons of practical convenience), they would protest that you are asking them to stop being who they are. 揇oing so, they would say, is a part of our identity. Then we would be speaking of identity again, but in a new, psychological, sense, meaning that people stick to the practices by means of which they define themselves. We might even say they identify with their language or with their religion. Obviously, these two meanings of the word 搃dentity are different. Taking the word in the first of these two meanings, we are exercising a concept of identity each time we make a definite reference to something. Being able to refer to something in a definite way implies being able to refer to it again and again, so that the reference goes to one and the same thing. The concept of identity we are then using is a logical one: let抯 qualify it as the concept of referential identity. In the second meaning of the word 搃dentity, we are considering the reasons people would give for what they are doing. They insist in doing something for the reason that, according to them, doing so is required from them because of who they are. Identity, when it is so understood, is no longer a matter of being the same item already referred to in a discourse, it is a matter of being oneself and being aware of one抯 individuality. I will call it psychological identity (following the psychoanalyst Erik Erikson who called it 損sychosocial). Now, what kind of psychology do we bring into the picture with that new sense of the word? Psychological identity, when it means a justification for what I do, is not a matter of cognitive psychology, dealing with how I know and remember who I am. Rather, the psychology of identity as understood in contemporary social sciences is a moral psychology. It is moral in so far as it is concerned with moral sentiments, that is to say with self-assessment feelings such as self-esteem, pride, shame, humiliation and generally amour-propre. 3. From logic to moral psychology Referential identity and moral-psychological identity are not only different concepts, they are logically different concepts. It is not immediately clear why we have the same word 搃dentity for these two concepts. In fact, it is not obvious that 揹efining oneself has anything to do with identity in any legitimate sense of the word. For example, let抯 say that I consider that being a professor is a part of my identity. There is nothing individuating in the fact of being a professor : I am just one of so many professors. I could not identify myself as an individual by introducing myself under that general description. The sentence 揑 am a professor gives you a mere indefinite description of my person. Other people besides me are professors, which makes it paradoxical to say that the attribute 損rofessor is somehow responsible for my individuality, for my being myself, that is to say for being the unique person I am. Nevertheless, we find it natural to think of one抯 idea of oneself as defining one抯 identity, even when this definition consists in a general affiliation or a social status such as being a professor. Let抯 take an example from conflicts involving issues of identities and social recognition (in the sense of the Hegelian notion of Anerkennung). Suppose you are prevented from performing a ritual which you take to be a part of your identity. In such a case, you could say that the injustice of the situation consists in the fact that you are prevented from being yourself, precisely because you are defining yourself by observing that ritual. I am not now examining whether your protest would be legitimate, only whether it would be intelligible. Would we understand your protest? It seems to me that we do understand such claims of identity and that we can spell out what we would understand. What would happen to you in case you would be prevented from doing what you insist on doing? Of course, not being yourself does not mean that you would have been turned literally into another person. It does not mean that we could make an inquiry about which person you became when your stopped being who you were. Still it would be a matter of identity, since the injustice would be that you would be expected - and even required - to behave as if you were not the person you are, but another one. Somebody says : 揃eing an X is a part of my identity. We could say that she identifies with the attribute of belonging to the community X. She could not accept or even imagine ceasing to be an X. In fact, the attribute X is not necessary for her being in existence in the factual sense of the word. Of course, she could well survive the loss of her attribute X. But she could not maintain her idea of herself, her self-definition, if she accepted that loss. Without it, there would no longer be for her any possibility of self-esteem or of self-satisfaction. And that抯 what she means by saying : 揑 would no longer be myself. So the moral psychological concept of identity is no longer referential, since the question 揥hich person are you when you are not yourself ? does not make sense. Nevertheless, the psychological concept cannot be explained without falling back on the referential one. Although the two meanings are logically distinct, they are not unrelated. It is not just by chance that we use the word 搃dentity, which conveys a sense of uniqueness and individuality, to express the idea of being oneself. Therefore we need to understand the logical concept of identity before being able to make use of a concept of identity in the psychological, moral sense. In effect, we rely on our understanding of the difference it makes to refer first to somebody and later to somebody else in order to give a content to the idea of a person identifying with an element of his or her life. So we must start from the logical, referential use of the word. I will proceed in two steps: - First, I will argue that the logic of identity is the logic of proper names. Consequence: the logic of collective identities is the logic of collective names. - Second, I will raise the question whether collective identities are mere notional constructions, as maintained by social theorists of nominalistic persuasion. 4. The logic of proper names First, let抯 have a short excursus in the logic of proper names. Wittgenstein gives the following illustration. We are at a meeting, and I tell you while pointing to somebody in the room: 揟his man is called Smith. Then, having told you the name of that man, I can go on describing that person: 揝mith is a mathematician, 揝mith is lazy, and so on. Wittgenstein observes I could have said 揟his man is a mathematician, 揟his man is lazy, instead of referring to him by his name 揝mith. I could have used the indexical expression 搕his man instead of the name as long as I could have singled him out in the room by pointing to him. But let抯 suppose now that Smith leaves the room. I can no longer refer to him by means of a demonstrative. I need to use a definitive description or, better, his name if I want to say something about him. Now, what is the rule for the use of the name 揝mith? In order to be the proper name of a man, the word 揝mith has to be used to refer to the same man as the one who was introduced to us under that particular name. In other words, says Wittgenstein, we understand the meaning of the proper name 揝mith provided we are able to use it again and again in the future for the same person. Suppose the door opens and somebody enters into the room. Understanding the proper name 揝mith consists in our being able to ask whether the person who is entering into the room is the same man Smith as the mathematician who left the room a few minutes ago. Understanding proper names requires us to have criteria of identity for the objects we refer to by means of these names. We understand names for human beings because we have a criterion of identity for human beings. We have a criterion of identity for a human being if we are able to spell out what it takes for an individual to go on existing as the same human being during the whole course of his life. In other words, we have such a criterion if we are able to make sense of the phrase 搕he same person, 搕he same human being. This does not mean that we should be able to recognize the person by using some test, such as the resemblance, the voice or the DNA. It is not a matter of being able to find out, by applying some test, whether this man I am dealing with right now is the one I met once in the past. It is a matter of understanding the question about his identity: is he the same man as the one I encountered in the past? So l can now come to my topic proper, namely the logic of collective identities. Suppose that the thing we are referring to has the character of a collective entity. It is, for example, a school, an orchestra, a city, a whole country. I take it for granted that we can refer to such entities. If we can refer to them, we can give them proper names. Then we are applying a concept of collective identity each time we refer to one and the same collective entity, for instance the same school, the same orchestra, the same city, the same country. Here, as in the case of personal identity, one needs to understand the logic of reference to one and the same entity of a definite kind before being able to make sense of the new moral or existential meaning Now, as soon as we move into the domain of collective entities, we encounter an objection to our attributing to them an identity. The question will be raised : do we really have genuine collective names for groups, and therefore criteria of identity for groups? Here we need to address the issue of nominalism in the philosophy of social sciences. I will argue that nominalism with respect to groups is the thesis that collective identities are nothing more than social identities, as understood in contemporary social theories of identity. 5. Social identities Some writers mention social identities, others collective identities. Some even speak of 揷ollective social identities. Does it amount to the same? The philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah has given a useful summary of the way contemporary philosophers mean when they qualify the 搃dentity with the adjective 搒ocial. According to him, social identities are conceived as classifications of persons. Such classifications have three characteristics. They are nominal, they are normative, they are subjective. 1/ First, social identities are nominal. In other words, we must give a nominalistic account of what is meant by 揾aving a social identity. When we attribute social identities, we are just classifying persons. As Appiah puts it, a social identity is like a label. We apply labels to each other in saying such things as : 揟his man is a mathematician, 揟his woman is a writer, etc. Classifying persons by means of labels provides them with social identities on two counts : - On the one hand, I may share with other individuals the label that has been imposed on me, which in some cases might produce in us a sense of togetherness and solidarity, something like the feeling of being in the same boat. - On the other hand, the label that has been imposed on me is the expression of what people around me think of me. It encapsulates a social judgment on myself. 2/ A second feature of social identities, according to Appiah, results from the first one. Social identities are normative. Indeed, for an individual, there are practical implications of being 揷ategorized as an X: in terms of expectations, assigned status, both on the part of the categorized individual and on the part of people around that individual. As soon as I am classified as an X, people will expect me to behave as an X. And if I 搃nternalize the social classifications that are imposed on me, I will expect other people to recognize my status 揳s an X and to behave accordingly towards me. So with the social categorization of persons, social norms come into the picture. 3/ Social identities are subjective. Another way to put it would be to insist that they are 搒ocially constructed. The idea is that social classifications would not matter if people did not pay attention to way they are classified. Appiah writes: social identities exist and are effective in so far as they play a role 搃n the thoughts and acts of those who bear them (p. 151). Appiah gives various examples of social identities so conceived. He distinguishes five kinds of such nominal identities: bodily attributes (such as race and gender), personal commitments (such as religion in a secular society), professional identities (e.g. teacher, philosopher). He adds less definite identities which he calls vocations (artist, composer) and affiliations (that is to say shared affinities of taste: baseball fan, jazz aficionado) Obviously, these examples compose an odd list of heterogeneous items. So, what are we to make of 搒ocial identities? Appiah is perfectly right to call these classifications nominal entities. In effect, they have no counterpart in reality apart from the individuals they classify in various groups. These taxonomic classes are nominal groups, the mere products of the repartition of individuals into the pigeonholes of a classification. In effect, a nominal group has no referential identity of its own, since it is nothing but an abstract object, namely, the set of elements sharing a description conveyed by a label such as 揂fro-American or 揃aseball fan. What does it take for two nominal groups to be one and the same group? The criterion is to be found in the composition of the groups. Since taxonomic groups are just logical extensions of concepts, the criterion of their extensional identity is to be drawn from their members : two nominal groups are one and the same group if they have the same elements. Any change in the list of the elements with the same label will result in the production of a new nominal group. In other words, nominal groups don抰 have a history, because they cannot survive a change in their memberships. And this is precisely what makes them nominal rather than real. Now what about the moral sense of social identities? Belonging to a taxonomic group is not a real relation of membership. In this respect, a social nominal group is not different from a blood group, which is a classification in a natural kind. Belonging to a blood group does not give you social connections nor does it provide you with a sense of being part of a community. It is the same with a social identity: the mere fact of being a woman, a philosopher or a baseball fan does not make you yet part of a community. It would take a real activity, on the part of the individuals belonging to the same nominal group, of uniting and establishing themselves as a group, to get something like a community with a moral identity of its own. But then, we are moving from the topic of social identities to the topic of collective identities. 6. Collective identities I have just argued that social identities are grounded in individual attributes of human persons. Since they are nominal, we should avoid reifying them into independent entities. A classification of person is nothing over and above a mere collection of individuals, that is to say a nominal group. Now, is there room in the nature of things for real groups? One way to address that ontological question is to look at the logic of proper names. Do we have proper names for collective entities or groups? It seems obvious that we have such names. If so, we are in a position to refer again and again to the same groups. Which is to say that we are equipped with criteria for the identities of these groups. Where do we find such criteria for collective identity? To get an example of collective proper names, I have looked in Wikipedia at an article (written in English) called 揕ist of oldest universities in continuous operation. The list includes : the University of Bologna (1088), the University of Oxford (1167), the University of Cambridge (1209), the University of Salamanca (1218), and others. The author of the article explains why the list will not include any French university, although the University of Paris could claim to be one of the oldest in Europe, even older than Oxford according to some historians. But, as we know, French universities were suppressed during the French Revolution (in 1793). Therefore no French university has been 搃n continuous operation since the time of its founding. So the Sorbonne, although it was founded at some point in the middle of the twelfth century, does not make it to the list, since it was suppressed in 1793 and only re-established as such in 1896. Obviously, working out a list of the oldest European universities in continuous operation since their foundation requires being able to refer to them and to name them. And this raises the question whether, say, the Sorbonne of 1896 has any title to the claim of being the same University as the one founded in the twelfth century. I will make three remarks concerning this Wikipedia article. First, as a matter of fact, universities have proper names. The string of words 揢niversity of Bologna is a proper name, although it might look like a definite description. In fact, there could be several universities in the city of Bologna, but there could not be several establishments called 搕he University of Bologna, with a capital 揢. Since universities have proper names, they are real groups, which implies that they have an identity of their own. Second, it is a disputed matter what should be the criteria for the diachronic identity of universities. The Wikipedia list is the result of applying two criteria to various candidates at the honor of being listed. First criterion: when was it founded? Second criterion: has it been in continuous operation since the time of its foundation? If we dropped the second requirement, the list would be different, since it would include the Sorbonne, the University of Toulouse (1229) and the University of Montpellier (1289). Third, real groups have a moral psychology. That is to say, it makes sense to attribute to them moral feelings such as pride, humiliation or resentment. A few years ago, I was visiting the University of Corsica Pasquale Paoli in the town of Corte (in the middle of Corsica). It was made obvious to me that people at the University of Corte are eager to place the date of their founding in the 18th century (1765) and not in 1981, when it was established (or reestablished) in its present form. Unfortunately, their university had been in operation only from 1765 to 1768, after what it was suppressed when the island was taken over by France. So it was not in operation and did not exist from 1768 to 1981. Nevertheless, the present faculty of the University of Corte is proud of the fact that they belong to an establishment founded by the national hero of Corsica, not merely to a new institution sharing its name with a former one. So the criteria for collective identities cannot be fully objective. They are partly drawn from the way people represent themselves and their memberships into a historical community. Therefore, real groups have collective identities in both the logical sense and the moral sense. In the logical sense: they can be identified, individuated, counted, referred to. In the morale sense: they have also a moral identity. As we just saw, issues of identity are not just matters of discussion for historians. They can also give rise to disputes among the members of these real groups. People can take pride of their being members of an old and well established group. So there is a way leading from the referential meaning of a collective proper name to moral-psychological meaning attached to that name. Of course, you could say that the moral feelings associated with belonging to a famous university are experienced by individuals, people in the flesh like you and me. There is no denial that it takes a living human individual to experience feelings about his or her affiliation. Nevertheless, we are perfectly justified to attribute the moral sentiments to the group as such, since this is exactly what the members of group are doing when they express their sentiments about their group in the first person plural, saying things such as: we are one of the oldest University in Europe, or we are the University founded by the Corsican Hero Pasquale Paoli. 7. Self-defining communities : a criterion of identity for a polis (Aristotle, Politics, Book III) Let抯 consider an assertion of collective identity. Somebody addresses an audience and says to them: 揥e are the group so-and-so. Since the group claims to have a proper name, it can only exist, if it exists at all, as a real group, not as mere classificatory group such as a blood group. Therefore, we need a criterion of identity for such a group. We cannot extract such a criterion from the mere notion of a group, a gathering of individual persons. I will rely on a discussion by Aristotle in order to make that point. What is a city? That抯 precisely the question Aristotle raises at the beginning of Politics, Book III, Chapter I (1274b34). As usual, Aristotle proceeds toward a definition through a series of approximations and corrections. The idea that will emerge from the discussion is that defining the 搘hat it is to be a city (its ti esti) amounts to giving criteria for a plurality of people being the same city as was there before. Which means : as was there before these people were even born. We will know what it is for Athens to be a polis when we will be able to say whether Athens is the same city as was already there in the past. Once you have criteria of identity for such an entity as a city, you know what it is to be a city. In order to make that point, Aristotle takes the occasion of a contemporary debate among Athenians. At that time, the Athenians were discussing whether they should pay back the money that was borrowed from the Spartans by the thirty tyrants. Some people were arguing that the democratic city of Athens was a different city from the one ruled by the tyrants since it had a new constitution (politeia). Suppose they were right in holding that opinion. Then they would have been entitled to claim the present city of Athenians had nothing to do with the former Athens of the tyrants. Aristotle sees clearly that, in order to deal with this kind of question, we need to associate with the proper name of the city a criterion of identity for cities. He asks : What do we mean by 搕he same city? 揥hat is exactly the principle on which we ought to pronounce a city to be the same or not the same but a different city?  (1276a 17-19) Then Aristotle considers and rejects various answers to the identity question. First, one is tempted to answer: the city we have now is the same as the one that was there before if it is at the same place. Against such a geographical criterion, Aristotle objects that the mere fact of living together at the same location and even living together within a closed space does not turn a bunch of people into citizens of the same city in the political sense. What would be lacking is a sense of citizenship and collective responsibility for the welfare and the future of the city. Then what does make this particular city the same as the one we used to call by the name 揂thens if it is not just the place? Can we take as a criterion of identity of the city the fact that it has the same individual members? The city would be the same just in case it had the same individual citizens as before. Its identity would be extensional. According to such a criterion, the identity of a city is nothing but a reflection of the identities of its citizens Aristotle explains why that answer fails on two counts. First, says Aristotle, a city is like a river in respect of its composition: at any time, some citizens are dying and some are born, so that the succession of generations can be compared to the flux of water in a river. Aristotle points out that we don抰 say it抯 the same river when the water is the same. The criterion of identity for a river is not material. It is to be drawn from its banks, its bed, its geographical location. The identity of a river is not the identity of the water constituting the river at a given time. A city, like a river, is a composite and fluid entity. We should draw our criterion of identity from its form, that is to say from the way the successive components are brought together, not from its matter. Aristotle puts forward another objection. Even when group A and group B have the individual members, this is not enough for them to form one and the same group. Aristotle gives here the example of a chorus. 揥e say that a chorus which on one occasion acts a comedy and on another a tragedy is a different chorus although it is often composed of the same persons, and similarly with any other common whole (koin鬾ia) or composite structure (sunthesis) we say it is different if the form of its structure (eidos t鑣 sunthese魋) is different (1276b5-8) Having disposed of these misconceived answers, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that what makes a city the same city is its politeia - a word that we translate as 揷onstitution. It is the politeia which gives to the koin鬾ia its structure or, as he puts it, its 揻orm of composition (eidos t鑣 sunthese魋). [In other words, a city is not a mere association of individuals. It is an association of citizens, a political community, and this is where we need to look in order to determine our criterion of identity. The criterion must be derived from the way the citizens think of themselves as what makes them members of the same city. The criterion should be taken from their self-consciousness as citizens.] So, according to Aristotle, the identity criterion for a city is its constitution : what makes a city the same polis is that it has the same politeia. Does Aristotle advocate a kind of 揷onstitutional patriotism (to borrow a term from J黵gen Habermas)? Is he arguing that the collective identity of a political community can only come from its adhesion to the fundamental laws of the State? Here, one should consider the Greek concept of politeia, a word we rightly translate by 揷onstitution. For us, however, questions of constitutional rule belong to jurists. Experts on constitutional law will discuss topics such as : 揇o we have a presidential regime or a parliamentary one?, 揥hat should be the status of the judiciary?, 揥hat are the constitutional rights of the citizens, etc? These are questions about the political institutions in a restricted, modern, sense of what we understand by the political domain. It is clear that Aristotle is using the word politeia in a much broader sense: the politeia as he understands it includes all the distinctive institutions of the city, not just the political ones in our restricted sense. As we have seen, Aristotle introduces the notion of constitution by saying that a city, like a piece of music, has a structure, a 揻orm of composition. In Book VII, Aristotle glosses the word 損oliteia as 揹iathesis pole魋 (1324a17), the way the city is organized. However the mere notion of a structure is not enough to get the content of politeia. In order to capture the Greek meaning of politeia, one has to add to the notion of structure an element of finality and purpose. By keeping their constitution, the citizens are trying to achieve something. They are trying to organize themselves according to their idea of the good life (eu z阯). What does it take for a human being to achieve excellence (aret)? It all depends on the way they understand human excellence, and this is something different from one city to another one. As to us, we don抰 expect our professors of constitutional law to discuss questions about the good life. Nor do we expect them to hold the view that achieving a virtuous life is the point of the constitution. Aristotle, as we know, undertook a comparative study of the 揷onstitutions (politeiai) of various peoples around the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, such an inquiry was what we would call today an anthropological research into the cultures of distinct societies. In Book VII of the Politics, Aristotle gives us some sense of what such a study was all about. In order to understand the constitution of a people, you have to look not just at the way it rules itself, but also at its paideia, that is to say, at its institutions of education : how it turns the new comers into citizens. For example, Aristotle mentions the fact that among many Mediterranean societies of his time, a male human being (an鑢, not anthr魀os) is not yet a full-grown citizen until he has killed enemies. In such societies, the general aim of the politeia which is everywhere eudaimonia happiness is understood and defined as domination of one抯 people over other peoples. For instance, among Scythians, 揳t a certain festival a cup was carried round from which a man that not killed an enemy was not allowed to drink (1324b17). No need to say that Aristotle does not think of these military politeiai as being the best way to give a definite content to the idea of a good common life. What these observations show is that Aristotle does not isolate the constitutional rules from the common customs and practices. To understand a politeia, you have to look at the way people deliberate and take political decisions, but you have also to look at their festivals and, most important, at the way they raise their children. Today, we would say that he understands political science in such a broad sense that it would include the study of cultural identities, not just constitutional provisions and arrangements. The consequence of Aristotle抯 discussion is that there is an element of will in the definition of the city. He says that the word 損olis (city) has several meanings. Like the word 揵eing, it is a pollach魋 legomenon. According to one definition, the Athenians ought to pay back the debts. According to another definition, they are not under any obligation to reimburse the money borrowed by the tyrants. Somehow it抯 up to them to make up their minds about what they are supposed to be together when they call themselves 搕he City of the Athenians, and also at the same time to undertake to have their own definition recognized by the other cities around them. And this is what makes their koin鬾ia, their community, a political one a way of governing themselves. According to Aristotle, a city is like a river. Both rivers and cities are historical individuals, meaning that these entities have diachronic identities, so that it makes sense to ascribe historical changes to them changes which make them different in their composition without turning them into other individuals of their kinds. However, there is a remarkable difference between a river and a city. Rivers may have names, but, even when they can be referred to by their names, they don抰 care about being named and having a good name. There is no moral psychology of rivers, whereas there seems to be, according to our psychological use of the word 搃dentity, a moral psychology of groups. Groups can have goals, they can define what they are up to and assess themselves in respect with their achievements. As soon as a human group manifests a concern about its own well-being, it has a sense of itself which the members of the group will express using the first-person pronoun in the plural. This pronoun could be called the political 搘e, since it is a way of expressing views about the way the group should be governed. 8. The semantics of 搘e Textbooks define the word 搘e as the pronoun of the first person plural. Actually, it might be misleading to speak here of a plural form of the first pronoun. The plural of the noun 揷at is 揷ats. We know how to use that plural. For instance, we can make sure we are dealing with a plurality of cats by counting them: 揾ere is one cat, and there we have another cat, and there again a third one, etc. But we don抰 get a 搘e by pluralizing a 搈e, since there no way to add a second 搈e to a first 搈e so as to obtain a plural form of 搈e. 揥e is not a plural person, that is to say a sign for designating a mere plurality of individual persons, in the way 揷ats is the plural of 揷at. 揥e is a complex person, which means it has a structure. In order to build her 搘e, the speaker has to give it a form. She cannot just add other people to her own person. She needs to define a principle of composition, and this implies defining her own position with regard to other people who are not presently speaking, but who nevertheless are taken to be represented in the act of speech she is performing. Now this can be done in two ways, namely : (a) I say 搘e meaning 搈e + you, as opposed to 搕hem; (b) I say 搘e meaning 搈e + them, as opposed to 搚ou. In case (a), you are included in my 搘e, which means that I am claiming to form a complex person with you. Of course, you can disagree. You can tell me : 搒peak for yourself alone, don抰 count me in. If so, I would have failed in my attempt to expand my own person into a collective person including all of you, to whom I am presently speaking, in addition to me. In case (b), I am not claiming you as a co-member of the collective person I intend to refer to. On the contrary, I am addressing you, who are a stranger to our group, to tell you about us. I am claiming to represent other people (them) who are not present here or who are not in a position to participate in this act of speech (the one I perform with you as my audience). Here again, of course, my claim can be disputed, both from outside and from inside. In other words, the pronoun 搘e is essentially a dialogical term : it establishes a definite relationship between speaker and hearer. It involves a dimension of self-positioning towards other people. The person I am addressing by saying 搘e may be included or excluded from the complex subject I am referring to by means of 搘e. [So the great difference between the singular pronoun 揑 and the complex pronoun 搘e is that the singular one cannot be questioned, whereas the collective one is not immune from criticism and refutations. When I say 揑 did it, you can question the fact that I did it, but not the fact that I am the one claiming to have done it. But if I say 揥e did it, you can raise doubts both about what we really did and about my claim to be speaking for the whole of us. This distinction will not be granted by some contemporary philosophers. Post-modern thinkers generally hold the view that both pronouns are deeply problematic. According to them, the use of any first personal pronoun is loaded with metaphysical assumptions and should not be accepted without a lot of deconstructive precautions. Is this an opinion we should take seriously? I think it is the result of a confusion about the logic of referential identity. In the case of 揑, the objection seems to be that I cannot use the pronoun 揑 without claiming to be an immutable entity exempt from change. By saying 揑 at various occasions, according to that view, I am somehow representing myself as being a simple, indivisible, changeless entity. In fact, when I refer to somebody by name, I am not assuming anything about the person named, except that I am singling out one and the same human being as the one who went by that name in the past. I say nothing about her internal state or composition at the present time. Exactly the same argument applies to myself speaking in the first-person: when I tell you the story of my life in the first person, I am telling you the story of one and the same human being, but of course this human being is an historical individual like a river, not a unchanging entity like a number or a Platonic form. And it is the same with the pronoun 搘e. Here, the objection would be that using 搘e presupposes a kind of unanimity and concord in our community that is never to be achieved in real life. Now, again, the objection amounts to a confusion between the referential issue and the descriptive issue. On the one hand, I might be telling which community is my community: this would be a matter of applying a principle of individuation for the kind of group I want to refer to. Then, we can raise another question: is the community I identify as mine in a state of peaceful cohesion or is it divided against itself? This is an entirely different matter. As a matter of fact, in order to address the question about the present state of my community, I need to have already secured my reference to it. I need to have identified, among all the communities of the same kind, the one that is mine.] How does that semantics work in Aristotle抯 example of the Athenians? It is certainly up to the Athenians to define the politeia from which they derive the identity of their political community. But, as we saw, they cannot decide unilaterally what their collective identity will be. Other cities around the Athenians have a say on that matter, especially if they have lent money to them in the past and are still waiting for being paid back. The Athenians have an internal debate about the meaning of the word 損olis and whether they have inherited the debts of the tyrants. Such a debate is a political debate because it should lead to a collective decision about their existence as a group. Now, what makes their decision the decision of a real group rather than the outcome of an aggregation of individual choices ? The decision being collective is not a matter of unanimity among citizens. It is the decision of the group because the citizens could not first have that sort of debate between them, and then, after having reached a conclusion, just inform the rest of the world of their result. The decision they have to make is not entirely a matter of domestic policy, it is at the same time an issue of foreign policy. There is no way they could answer the question of their collective identity 揥ho are we as citizens of Athens? without asking the external world to accept their existence as a city under that identity. They are not yet a real group until other cities take them to be a real group rather than a collection of individuals. Identity is a matter of recognition by others as much as a matter of decision. 9. Real collective identities In this paper, I tried to make two points. First, I undertook to show that a philosophy of collective identities should start from the referential notion of identity. A group is endowed with a collective identity as soon as it can really be given a proper name. It can be given a real proper name if it can be provided with a criterion of identity. Fictitious entities cannot be given real names, only fictitious names. The logic of identity in this referential sense is the logic of proper names. Then, I considered the notion of identity in the psychological, moral sense. What are the main characteristics of a collective identity, understood as something people can be proud of and can give care for? Social identities were rightly described by Appiah as nominal, normative and subjective. Collective identities, by contrast, are real, teleological and subjective. 1/ Collective identities are real in so far as they are not derived from the identities of the individuals. Groups have an identity of their own. In other words, the relation between an individual and the group to which that individual belongs is not a mere logical membership into a classificatory group, it is a real relationship between two concrete beings (that is to say, beings which we can name). This is the sense in which the group to which I belong has an existence transcending my own existence, since it was there before my birth and will, hopefully, survive my own death. 2/ Collective identities are teleological. It makes sense to refer to the common good of the group, meaning not an interest that happens to be common to all members, or at least to most of them, but the good of their community as such. It makes sense for me to say, e.g. in a debate among us about what we should do as a group, that our group would be harmed by policy A, but that it would benefit from the implementation of policy B. On the other hand, it does not make sense to care for the good of a social nominal group, since there is no such thing as the well-being of a mere taxonomic entity. But it makes sense for people to care for the well being of some of the real groups to which they belong. 3/ Collective identities are in some respect subjective in so far as they involve an element of will and self-consciousness on the part of the members of the group. They are partly subjective on two counts. First, their existence is a matter of self-consciousness on the part of the members. People belong to blood groups or statistical categories simply by having such and such common characteristic: these classifications apply to them no matter what they know or think about it. But it is otherwise with real groups. The reality of these groups shows up in the fact that they have to care for their own continuity in time by implementing their institutions of paideia and collective memory. Second, collective identities have a subjective dimension in providing individuals with specific feelings, which manifest the degree of their identification with their communities.  L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, Blackwell, 1974, 202-203. I have substituted in the examples the name 珷Smith牷 to the letter 珷N牷.  Kwame Anthony Appiah, Lines of Descent: W.E.B. du Bois and the Emergence of Identity, Harvard UP, 2014, p. 147-152.  Aristotle, Politics, tr. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Series. 1977.  P魋 pote chr legein t鑞 polin einai t鑞 aut鑞 h m t鑞 aut鑞 all抙eteran.  Politics, III, 1276a23.Logic of collective identities  PAGE 1#   # . 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