邢唷> mpjkl欹U 餜; bjbj雗雗8閍閍^) @pPPPddd8pTd袿0   NNNNNNN$R稵H&NeP     &NPP4婳/// ` PPN/ N//>@預P+!n-闌霱0袿AT/蟄,預預T玌$P凚h   /     &N&N/   袿    蟄         V :  Interiority, Desire and Representing ProcessVincent Shen University of TorontoAbstract After featuring three meanings of 搃nteriority in Chinese philosophy, that is, the Centrality, the Mind and transcendence within interiority, I will extend the function of mind to desire, feeling and thought, in particular the concept of unselfish desire, and the idea of the non-duality between body and mind, all in extending the concept of interiority to the extent of seeing desire as the locus from where arises the dynamism of human meaningfulness of life. I will make the distinction between desiring desire, desirable desire and desired desire. Desiring desire as the first movement of meaningfulness, translates itself into different levels of representations: beginning by sensual representations, like tactic, tasty, acoustic, visual, in a word, imagery, then the emergence of mental representations, then verbal representations, first oral then written. The dialectical movements between desiring desire and the desired desire is thus the common origin of work of art, though their structure is quite different according to levels of complexities. I will see the development of meaningfulness through the representing process developing into higher and higher level, until transcending itself into encountering with the ultimately real. I will combine both phenomenology and Chinese philosophy in doing all these. Thus we will begin by the primordial level of body and desire, then proceed to discuss the emergence of different levels of meaningfulness in representing process, until mystical union with the ultimate reality. Key terms: Body, Desiring desire, Desirable Desire, Desired Desire, Representing Process, TranslatabilityInteriority in Chinese Philosophy and my focus For me there are three major concepts/ideas related to Chinese philosophy抯 notion of interiority: the concept of centrality, the concept of xin (mind/heart /feeling) and the idea of inner-transcendence or transcendence within interiority. The concept of centrality is already implicit in the chapter Grand Matrix of the Classics of Documents, where the fifth category 憆oyal ultimate is central to all nine categories, and thereby arguable applicable, as suggests by Thom Fang, to Mircea Eliade抯 idea of axis mundi (center of the world). In fact, it explicitly means only the royal fairness, or impartiality of the king. This is developed into a transcendental psychological idea of interiority in connection with cosmic centrality, as evidenced by the Centrality and Commonality (Doctrine of the Mean) where the concept of centrality means both the psychological inner core and the center of the universe or the ultimate reality, both closely related. It is said there 揟he state of mind prior to the manifestation of happiness, anger, sorrow and joy, is called centrality; whereas their manifestations in due measure is called harmony. This transcendental self is closely related to the centrality of the universe (or ultimate reality), and when obtained by the sage in his mystical union with it, this psycho-ontological centrality can make the best effect of all things in heaven and earth, each in its own right place and all prosper and well nourished. Thus it is said that, 揅entrality is the great root of all under heaven, whereas harmony is its excellent way. In achieving centrality and harmony, heaven and earth will be in their right position and all things therein will be nourished and flourish. However, a jump from the psychological to the ontological is committed here as shown in the texts, except in case when there is indeed the mystical union of the two centralities, that is, that of the sage and the Centrality as Ultimate Reality. That抯 why Confucius at the end of this first part of text laments for the impossibility of commoners to obtain the centrality and commonality. He says, 揂las! It is impossible to obtain the centrality and commonality! That抯 why, after this first part, the discourse of Centrality and Commonality moves from centrality to sincerity (of mind), which is more accessible to everyone, including the sage and commoners. The second concept is Mind. Developing out of sincerity of mind of Si-Meng School, Mencius articulates this concept as xin (Mind/heart/feeling), starting with the siduan (four sprouts), that is, feeling of commiseration, felling of shame and dislike, feeling of respect and reverence, feeling of right and wrong, and argue thereby for the goodness of human nature. It is by calling back one抯 outgoing mind Bl>e胈, that one returns to one s own good nature. Further, Mencius bestows xin with a metaphysical function in saying that  He who knows to fulfil /feelings one s mind/heart , knows his own nature; he who know his own nature knows Heaven. The concept of xin becomes a basic concept of Chinese philosophy in regard to human interiority. Both Classical Confucianism, Neo Confucianism, especially in the Lu Xiangsan and Wang Yangming抯 tradition, and Huanglao Daoism, for example, in the chapter Neiye (Inner working) where xin after purification becomes jingshe (the House of Subtle Qi the ultimate reality), and even Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, make it their core concept. The one sided development of this concept of xin into an idealist and immanentist philosophy brings us to the third meaning of interiority in Chinese philosophy, that is, neizai chao yue (transcendence within interiority), which means rather a transcendence inside the mind than appealing to an outside-transcendence. This view is best articulated by the Modern Neo-Confucian Mou Zongsan (and his followers). Basing on his interpretation of Mencius, Lu Xiansan and Wang Yangming, Mou adds a surplus of intellectual intuition to Kant抯 transcendentalism, and sustains that human mind has the access to infinite free mind (陙1u!qP柮_), and thereby the intellectual intuition into the moral truth and ultimate reality, and thereby establish an ontology of non-attachment (!q鱓剉X[ g謯), as a metaphysics of morality. However, transcendence within pure interiority is not the only choice of Chinese philosophy. For example, Zhu Xi, who belongs to the realist school of Neo-Confucianism, sees li(reason, principle) as principle of both things and self, also as common name of all principles, and finally as the ultimate reality. Thus his emphasis is put on the objectivity, while it is also possible for him to know one抯 own interior self through the detour of knowing things and their principle first. Another example is Yan-Li School in Qing Dynasty, which proposes a philosophy of body, and denies the dualism between body and mind, between Nature of heavenly endowment and Nature of physical temperament. After them, Dai Zheng has extended the function of mind/heart to a whole range of Desire/Mind/feeling, in taking up the dimension of unselfish desire as necessary for human existence. In his Yuanshan (烻刄 Treatise of the Good), Dai Zhen expresses a philosophy of life, in which what is achieved as good in human and animal life, is seen as a continuation of the cosmic Good as a whole, to be expressed by human desire, feeling, and mind. Thus the concept of interiority is open and thereby extended to an integral concept of body and mind, desire and feeling, human mind and cosmos. All beings, including human, derive their existence from Heaven and earth, and owe their development to the initial creative cosmic energy that makes them desire for goodness. The unselfish desire leads them to humaneness; the unimpeded awareness guides them to wisdom. Humaneness and wisdom are the best of moral excellence. And his interpretation of Mencius is very different from Lu Xiangsan and Wang Yangming, emphasizing Mencius saying that, 揊or nourishing the mind there is nothing better than to have few desires. Dai Zhen says, in his Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius, that 揑t is clear that men should not be without desires at all but should have only a few. There is no greater pain in man抯 life than being unable to preserve and fulfill one抯 own life. To desire to preserve and fulfill one抯 own life and also to preserve and fulfill the desires of others is humaneness (ren). To desire to preserve and fulfill one抯 own life to the point of destroying the lives of others without any regard is inhumanity.Whatever issues from desire is always concerned with life and its support. When desire is wrong, it is the result of selfishness and not of obscuration. In this paper, I will follow Dai Zeng, all in developing his idea of extending the function of mind to desire, feeling and thought, in particular his concept of unselfish desire, and Yan-Li school抯 idea of the non-duality between body and mind, all in extending the concept of interiority to the extent of seeing desire as the locus from where arises the dynamism of human meaningfulness of life. Then I will see the development of meaningfulness through the representing process developing into higher and higher level, until transcending itself into encountering with the ultimately real. I will combine both phenomenology and Chinese philosophy in doing all these. Thus we will begin by the primordial level of body and desire, then proceed to discuss the emergence of different levels of meaningfulness, until mystical union with the ultimate reality. II. The primacy of body Both Phenomenology and Chinese Philosophy pay high regard to the role of body in their notions of the human, especially on the body-mind relationship issue. In the context of the twentieth Century Western philosophy, Heidegger switched from the Cartesian 揓e pense, donc je suis style of subjectivity interpreted by Husserl抯 phenomenological 搕ranscendental ego, to the interpretation of human being as Dasein, as transcendence regarding specific space-time determination in manifesting Being Itself, thus emphasizing the ontological transcendence beyond intellectual subjectivity. Later, the Heideggerian Dasein was replaced by Merleau-Ponty抯 notion of corps propre, seen as the original encounter of myself with the world. The body is therefore seen as the original locus of manifestation of Being. In its phenomenological incarnation, body has become the core of all human concerns, featuring the distinction between lived body (corps v閏u) and organic body (corps organique), in the exclusive preference of the corps v閏u. The concept of body has then become the basic tone of civilization in the twentieth century. As I see it today, human body, although the most basic point of departure of meaningfulness, when self-enclosured within itself, is also a no-outlet-road. I would say that in body contemporary philosophy comes down to the lowest bed of its valley. If without the possibility of going beyond, for example without life and reason, without variety of life stories, human body has no hope. With much longer and older history, Chinese philosophy has emphasized the importance of body since the times of Warring States. In the recently unearthed Confucian bamboo slips titled Wuxing, said to belong to the Si-Meng School, the word ren (罭)was written in a form composed of body and mind N珟 N胈 , instead of the morphology in two persons (孨篘簆罭). This would mean that for the early Confucians, body and mind were mutually related and sensible to each other so that one person could open to many others and be responsive to them. In fact, a life of sanity is a balanced yet creative state of body-mind in which human desire could conduce itself, at least hopefully, to the ultimate degree of meaningfulness, the full unfolding of its total potentiality. Daoism, too, emphasizes body, not only in Classical Daoism, but also in religious Daoism, for example, both Laozi Xiang Er Commentaries, and Laozi Middle Scriptures state clearly that 揗yself, that is dao, myself is my body Thus body was identified with myself which is the primordial access to dao. Thus, both traditional Chinese philosophy and Western contemporary philosophy put emphasis on the importance of body. However, there is a difference between them. When we look into the Chinese concept of body, the corps vecu is always in continuity with the corps organic, as we can see in Chinese philosophy and Chinese medicine; for example, in the Yellow Emperor抯 Internal Scripture, respected as the 揃ible in Chinese medicine, the organic body is never separated from the lived body. Keeping in my mind the lesson we learn from Chinese philosophy and the phenomenology of perception, the concept of incarnated body of Merleau-Ponty, in particular the phenomenology of affectivity in the line of Max Scheler, Paul Ricoeur, and Ghislaine Florival, I consider the whole of our lived body (corps v閏u) with organic body (corps organique) as the locus and mode of existence of our desire, which is the original dynamism in us toward a meaningful life, both cognitive and affective. Although Merleau-Ponty is not wrong in pointing out the phenomenological importance of the existentially experiencing body, or the lived body (corps v閏u), we should say, with Chinese philosophy and medicine, that the lived body is still in continuity with, and never separate from, the organic body. This is evidenced by our brain, our four limbs, our five organs, our hundreds of bone sections, in their support and expression of our existential emotions. Indeed, our brain is the result of a long evolutionary process, upgrading and integrating the frontal lobe, parietal lobe, temporal lobe, occipital lobe, limbic lobe, and insular lobe, etc., which serve as the organic support of all our motor-sensorial, affective, and intellectual and language functions. Therefore, we should take organic body and lived body as continuous yet distinct, thus making them into a whole instead of separating them into two totally different categories. Now, from this lived and organic body emerges our desiring desire which is our most original force toward meaningfulness. This desire arises from the phenomenological field of the lived and organic body. Body is seen as the phenomenological field in/from which our desiring desire rise, which, even if unconscious in the very beginning, will actively and continuously develop into higher forms of meaningfulness, as we will discuss in next section. Desire exists in our body and expresses itself through the movement of body. As Paul Ricoeur points out, body gives two ontological modes to our desire: first, it is where meaning first expresses itself; second, bodily movement is movement towards meaningfulness. In other words, the original desire in the body is the dynamic force towards meaningfulness, meanwhile it is also the locus where the meaningful action emerges. Here I will focus on the transcendental psychological makeup of human beings looking for meaningful life. What I mean by 搕ranscendental is that which is a priori to meanwhile making possible the empirical, though with this there is no opposite dualistic relation, but rather in a dynamic contrast. I will start with the desiring desire that goes beyond itself toward somebody/something looking for meaningfulness with an original generosity. Desiring desire as the first movement of meaningfulness translates itself into different levels of representations. Thus it抯 in the process of representing, always into higher and higher levels of complexities. III. Desiring Desire, desirable desire and desired desire Starting from our infancy, the unconscious desire in the body has an undetermined, uncertain energy looking for meaningfulness. This could develop itself into various representations of meaning and still transcend each specific form of realization. As the first form of our interiority, this original dynamism in human desire arises immanently and goes upwards evolutionarily, thus its beginning force has not yet arrived at the 搕ranscendental spirit emphasized by neo-Confucians like Mou Tsongsan and Tang Junyi, which must be seen as a later and ulterior development of the human being. However, the desire appears in human body since our infancy is earlier than its eventual forms of development like consciousness, mind/heart and spirit. For example, as Jacque Lacan points out, a baby from birth to six months cannot hold his/her body in unity, therefore has no sense of the self at all at this moment. However, a baby has already his/her desire and is already forming various kind of representations. In fact, our desiring desire, as the significant force going beyond ourselves towards another person and another thing, could go up for fuller extension, and turn into the psychological and the spiritual levels, which are conventionally recognizable. This tells us a dynamic and developmental story of mind, not mind/heart in its pure and static sense. What we have in all stages and lifeforms, is this desiring desire. Indeed, human beings are given birth by their parents, and they grow and develop among many others, therefore they receive life and learn language as gifts, and build up a life of meaningfulness first among significant others, then with many strangers. Human beings are relating with other persons and other things, that抯 why they desire them unconsciously as a dynamic vector towards many others. This original 揹irecting towards is called desire, while its conscious state could be called 搘ill. Basically all these come out from the same dynamic force, although they might be named differently, seen as different levels of its expression. I am under the inspiration of Maurice Blondel, a French philosopher of action, who makes a distinction between vonlont voulante (willing will), which is the primary, active, initiative act of willing, and volont voulue (willed will), which is the act of already willed, therefore a secondary and explicit side of the willing process. Blondel took these two as going along with the whole process of human existence and as a process of action. However, I would think it抯 too early to call it 搘ill before the conscious level, where we for sure already have in our infancy and everydayness a force towards meaningfulness, either conscious or nonconscious, which I prefer to call desire. Based upon these considerations, I make a distinction between 揹esiring desire, 揹esirable desire, and 揹esired desire. Let me explain. I understand the desire arising in our body as our original dynamic force tending towards meaningfulness. Body is therefore to be considered as the locus whereof emerges the first project for meaning. I agree with Merleau-Ponty that one抯 own body (corps propre), is the phenomenological field (champs ph閚om閚ologique) of our desire, the field in which appears the unconscious yet active desire towards meaningfulness. Jacques Lacan says, 搕he unconscious is structured like the language),攁nd that 搕he unconscious is the discourse of the other.  These words could be understood as expressing the basic truth that desire moves always towards the other, saying that the desire is first of all a moving beyond oneself towards other persons and other things, taking them as the signified of an inner yet directing signifier, the desiring desire within us. Therefore, the first moment of desire, the desiring desire, is unselfish, it moves beyond oneself toward the good in the other; this could be called the benxin ,g胈of each person, or the original generosity in each person to go beyond oneself to the good in the other. The second moment of desire is desirable desire. What is desirable is the good in the many others, towards which the desiring desire orients itself and becomes the desirable desire. As St. Thomas and Mencius both say, 搕he good is that which is desirable, the desirable is the good, thus it gives a direction to our desire. Our movement towards the good is the second moment of our desire, in which our desiring desire is given a direction, the direction towards the good. Thus it could be called chuxin R胈, or the starting mind/heart. Up to now, we have the benxin which is the first moment, the desiring desire, the moment of original generosity; the second moment is the desirable desire, the chuxin, which is a direction towards the good in the other, or in many others. At the third moment, the desirable desire is specified in an object or a group of objects, such as longing for drinking when thirsty, for food when hungry, or sexual desire or other more abstract desires such as desire for money, reputation, and power, or other desires caused by habits or preferences, when we have a determinate object. The objects of these desired desires are finite, specific, and determined. It is in laboring towards these objects, and, especially in enjoying these objects, that is to say in the jouiissance of it, that one becomes self-enclosured and therefore selfish. In sum, desire, in its first moment, the benxin, or the desiring desire, goes towards others generously; and in its second moment, the desirable desire, the chuxin, it tends towards the good in many others. Both of these moments are generous and good. Only in its third moment, that of laboring towards and of enjoying the specific object(s), could it becomes self-enclosure, and therefore selfish, and need what Confucius calls 搒ubduing one抯 self and returning to ritual, or Zhu Xi calls an effort of 揹iscarding human selfish desire, or what Aristotle calls the virtue of temperament. In this sense, I see the 搗irtuous nature emphasized by neo-Confucians under the influence of the Zhong Young, or Laozi抯 notion of 揹e (power), or the Buddhist concept of 搕hree good roots, being understood as denoting human and/or all things original good nature, original dynamic power, or benxin. As to what Laozi says 搘hen power is lost, the righteousness is lost accordingly; when the righteousness is lost, the ritual is lost accordingly, or when Mencius talks about the benxin抯 getting lost, or the metaphor of the treeless Mt. Tong, or even the fallen state of the unbridled indulgence of human desires and passions; or according to Buddhism, the three poisonous natures of lust, anger, and stupidity; all are talking about the enclosed selfishness of various degrees after the getting lost and fallen state of the original good nature or benxin. These have to be targeted as objects of corrections or therapy in order to liberate the mind and return to the original mind, or the desirable desire taking the good as its direction, or even the desiring desire with its own generosity to go outside of itself to many others. IV. Desire, body movement and representing process The dynamic process towards a meaningful life proceeds from body, but it does not limit itself to body, as the process of representability and appropriation of language should also be involved in the step-by-step transcending process in the formation of meaningfulness. On the level of body, the construction of meaning, beginning from translating desire into representations, and then from representations to the emergence of language, should finally consummate in interpersonal interaction. At the start, in everyday life, we experience the original tension between intimacy and otherness of our body. My body抯 intimacy to myself means I am my own body, or, that my body is closely related to myself, so that it is unlike my house, my car, my belongings, that it is an authentic part of my self. On this level, one can say 搈y body is myself. On the other hand, my body is also the first other to myself, in the sense that it sometimes resists my own will and is open to many others, that is, to many other people and many other things in the world. This fact proves that my body is other than myself. The contrast between intimacy and otherness of body with myself is solved, or better, integrated, in the body movement or the kinesthetic activities, when it interacts with the environment, that is with other people and other things. In body movement, or in kinesthetic activities, intimacy and difference are integrated in the process of strangification and self-reflection. We can say human desire moves towards meaning by way of strangification. Here, 搒trangification is understood in its etymological meaning as the act of going towards the other, strangers, towards many others. Thus it is seen here as the process of going beyond oneself towards many others and connecting with them in order to constitute a meaningful existence. For me, human desire is the original dynamism in us tending toward a meaningful life. It could be considered as an original power of strangification. Desire emerges from body and realizes itself through body movement. And this, when elaborated by different representational forms, such as the sensational, gestural, sonorous or pictorial, starts the moment by which the meaning projected in our desire becomes intelligible. As I see it, body in movement integrates and transcends the tension created by body抯 intimacy and difference, and starts to 損roduce representations, or starts the process of 搑epresenting (in Chinese chengxiang ba). Here we can discern a common origin of meaningfulness in body movement. When body movement produces representations such as sensations, sound, image, and gesture, it gives access to further intelligibility, even leading towards rationality. Western civilization emphasizes the function of sight for the intelligibility of things too much, for example Aristotle in his Metaphysics says right from the start that, 揂ll men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses, 協or even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that, this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many difference between things. Thus Aristotle takes sight to be the sense that makes us know and that brings to light many differences between things. However, sight is not the only sensation that brings us to light of differences. If to bring light means to reveal, then all senses have their ways of revealing, and the light in question here is not only in its physical sense but also in its metaphorical sense. Let me detail further. First, sensation, though said in the Husserlian phenomenology to show only one profile per sensation, is indeed a spot of light because of the revealing of things that it brings to us. Sensation is not only passive, it is also active going between myself and the things perceived. It allows persons and things to be touched, listened to, seen, tasted and smelt. Each reveals a certain representation of things all in opening to them. Thus it is a limited revealing of intelligibility: 搇imited in the sense of offering only a profile, as Husserl says; 搑evealing in the sense that it does show a direct contact between myself and things, manifesting a certain message, or better said, a revealing encountering of them. Sensibility, that is to say, to see, to hear, to touch, to taste, to smell, forms the first layer of representation that reveals, the first level of enlightening enjoyable in itself. Things reveal themselves in our sensation of them. Thus each sensation is considered as a light, as an enlightening through our skin opening to the world encountering with things. A light is already there with us. Truthfully, things have already gone through a way to come to us, a process across which to meet our sensations, they already have been existing there, and we will need a certain physiological-mental maturity in order to feel them there. For example, touching is most basic in our contact with things. It seems to be a contact between the limit of ourselves, or our skin, and the surface of things. As our largest organ, for Aristotle skin seems to be the topos idios within which our body exists. However, it is also considered as our first openness to the world. The contact, is not only the reflection of the limit, but also a mutual penetration, the first resonate place we have with things in the world, so real, so substantial, so 搕angible. Imagine our contact with the trees, the flowers, the herbs of the place we are familiar with, like our own home or our mother抯 home. You might touch the flowers and trees in telling them that you admire their beauty and love them. You love trees to love life altogether. Or again, our hearing is also the most intelligible sensation, only secondary to seeing, yet more primordial than this. Zhuangzi even says that hearing is prior to seeing, as listening is prior to reading. Yet, hearing is more touching to the human heart, combining both intelligibility and affectability. In particular, today抯 IPod, IPhone, mobile phone and music seem to emphasize a civilization of hearing, even to the point of becoming a 揾earer of the Logos. Thus, for us all sensations bring us to light, or we can say that each sensation is a light to our body. Somehow Rene Huyghe follows Aristotle in saying, in his L抋rt et L抋me that,揚our que l抩eil human soit assailli par ce harcellement de sensations ou il tente, depuis qu'il s抏st ouvert, de degager un order, pour que l抏sprit, embusque derriere lui et solitaire de sa tache, puisse s抋ppliquer a cette confusion, et y porter cet ordre et cette intelligence des choses qui prennent naissance avec la forme, il a fallu que la nature recueilli dans ses tenebres fut touchee par la lumiere. Ellle restait tapie, invisible, inconnue: le rayonne frappe. Elle se manifeste, elle deviant aspect.  We may say something similar, not only to the sense of sight, but to all sensations, in their bringing us a metaphorical sense of light, not only the physical sense of it. All sensations are like lights enlightening us with revealing messages, in particular their producing in us a sort of representation, which is not only representing, but first of all revealing. And from these sensational representations it evolves into further, more elaborated representations. Indeed, to become a representation is to appropriate more intelligible expressions to make explicit the rich meaning-intensions, first unconsciousness, later conscious, in the body. This will serve as the basis for translating the secret of unconsciousness into the language of consciousness. Through various representations, such as sonorous, pictorial, gestural, whole body, even dancing, the project of constructing meaningful life is specified. From the sense of hearing, it evolves into more elaborated form of sonorous, even with rhythmic pattern and therefore musical representations. From the tactile sensation and handwork, a man or woman attempts to work out forms with mud and wood, as in the case of pottery and sculpture. From the sense of sight, it evolves into that of images, even as elaborated as a pictorial representation. From partial or total body movements, it evolves into facial, gestural expressions or as dancing and theatrical performances. Thus, the movement of body in intelligible forms is the common origin of music, painting, pottery, sculpture, dancing and other performative arts, either as acting on, like painting, calligraphy, music, etc., or as acting out, like pottery, sculpture, dancing and performance. In this sense, body movement, especially body movement as elaborated by forms or working out forms, is significant for the process of meaning formation and meaning expression, and the common origin of all forms of art. The dynamism of our unconsciousness, no matter how dark, how unintelligible it is, always tends to construct meaning by expressing itself through representations. I consider this as the starting moment of strangification, the act of going out of one抯 self at a certain stage in search for meaning in the other. This is made evident by Freud when he discusses the dream-work in the Interpretation of Dreams. The mechanism of representability, together with those of condensation and displacement, constitutes the dream-work which makes manifest a certain dream-thought, Freud said, " A dream-thought is unusable so long as it is expressed in an abstract form; but when once it has been transformed into pictorial language, ... can be established more easily than before between the new forms of expression and the remainder of the material underlying the dream. "  Freud suggests that the dream-work renders manifest a certain dream-thought, which always contains the secret of a certain desire, by transforming it into a kind of pictorial language. The representability is a concrete form of expressing the desire, mediating between the new forms of expression and the remainder of the material under the dream. Even if this kind of representational expression is more concrete than the conceptual ones, nevertheless it is compatible to verbal language and even tends to find some appropriate verbal transformations for the individual thought. To simplify, human body, in pointing towards the other or many others, produces movement, and thereby appropriate sensational, or kinesthetic representations, such as sonorous, pictorial, gestural or performative, which will mediate between the desiring and desirable desires original intention for meaningfulness and its implementations, in order to move forward and upward. For the desiring desire, it directs itself spontaneously to many others- other persons or other things, thus giving the first dynamic vector for meaningfulness, and the potentiality of the whole representing process. As to the desirable desire, it produces various representations in regard to the goodness for many others oneself; whereas the desired desire, in encountering the objects, adding to the representations its concrete and empirical data and thereby materialize it. In the movement towards the other and many others and the interaction with them, it first produces non-verbal representations, such as the sensational and kinesthetic ones, then it turns upward into linguistic representations, so as to acquire more sophisticated tools to express, to communicate and to interact further with many others.V. Common intelligibility and Mutual translatability Through different forms of representation, such as sonorous, pictorial, gestural and dancing, meaningful human projection attains its specification and becomes a certain form of body movement with more or less determinate form of intelligibility. This is the common origin of music, painting, pottery, sculpture, dancing, performative arts etc., and therefore allow a common intelligibility from the subjective side, and this common intelligibility would allow them a certain mutual translatability. Not only this. It allows also the mutual translatability between various art forms of different cultural communities. Cultural difference is effected by the variations of different natures and structures of these sounds, pictures, and gestures. All these different forms of art, with their cultural differences, are but a kind of 搃nducer of desires, telling different stories of various ways of articulating and thereby determining the dynamism of desire looking for meaningfulness: all rely upon the representability of desire that determines, articulates, makes explicit, and directs human desire for meaning. The dynamism of human desire and its eventual further development represent the basic dynamic power of cross-territories and translatability among different categories of art. From the point of view of philosophy of art, this dynamism is also the common origin of different arts like music, painting, dancing, performing arts, calligraphy, poetry, etc., even there is an evolution from nonverbal representations towards verbal representations. Anyway, all these forms of art are inducers of desire, they are there to induce the desire towards its positive development, that is, in the construction of meaningful life in nonverbal and verbal representations. The authenticity and sincerity in this common origin and the common good for inducing the desire towards a meaningful life serve as the basis of common intelligibility, therefore common translatability, between forms of art and artistic emotions. This mutual translatability between artistic emotions and representations is made clear by one of the recently unearthed Confucian works, titled Mandate comes from Heaven('`陙}T鶴), which says, When happiness comes up to its extremity, it necessarily goes to sadness, just like when one cries one feels sad, too; all come from authentic feeling. Thus grief and happiness are similar in nature. That s why the core of their heart is not far from each other. Crying moves our heart, because it is sunken and depressed. That tends to decline slowly and end up sadly. Music/happiness touches our heart, in allowing the thoughtfulness to accumulate melancholily, its sound changes into sadness, and end up with thoughtful sad concern. This is to say that, melancholy, when gone through thought, becomes sad. Happiness, when gone through thought, becomes joyfulness. The function of the hear is most important in pushing them to go through thought. To sing is a way of thinking. When the sounds change, then the heart changes; when the heart changes, its sounds change, too.This text shows there is a mutual change, or even a dialectical process, happening between emotions like joyfulness and sadness. Further, not only are artistic emotions like joyfulness and sadness mutually exchangeable, when human beings are most sincere and authentic, but also forms of art, like music and dancing, are also mutually transformable and exchangeable, as we read, When one feels happy, one starts to elate. When one elates, one gets excited. When one gets excited, one starts to sing. When one sings, one starts to swing. When one swings, one starts to dance. Dancing is the conclusion of happiness. When one feel annoyed, one starts to have concern. When one has concern, one starts to be melancholy. When one has melancholy, one starts to sigh. When one sighs, one starts to beat one抯 chest. When one beats one抯 chest, one jumps up and stomp one抯 feet. Being annoyed leads finally to feet-stomping. Thus the mutual translatability between sadness and happiness, music and dancing, is assured by the sincerity of human feeling in its authentic development. And, thereby, artistic creativities are not only expressive of meaning, they have also therapeutic functions when channels for meaning expression are distorted and certain mental illness or symptoms of illness are thereby produced. By engaging in creative activities such as painting, music, dancing, performing arts, calligraphy, etc., various forms of representation could help make explicit, induce, or communicate the desire for meaningfulness and thus serve therapeutic functions when it is distorted by whatever reason. In this way artistic activities could have their therapeutic functions. A phenomenology of desire and body could therefore lay the existential foundation of psychotherapy, insofar as it embodies the first step towards a meaningful life, as a way to work out intelligible representations. For me, artistic creativity comes from the dynamism for meaningfulness and the original generosity in our desire to go beyond itself, thus inside it there is no discrimination of dao and qi (matter). What it looks for, is about revealing dao and its incarnation in the matter, and thereby the extension towards fulfillment of itself. In human body there is an ever gushing forth of creativity for meaningfulness. Indeed, in body there emerges the movement for meaningfulness, through the appropriation of representation, or the representing process, to obtain its specific and intelligible forms and thereby become specified. Therefore, I agree with C.G. Jong in his Red Book regarding what he calls the 搃maging process. However, I would say that the representations that human body/mind is capable of forming do not limit only to pictorial representation. Besides, there are other representations such as sonorous, gestural, and the synthesis of various forms of representation in the dynamic process of time. In this sense we can say that, if the representability, either as corporeal or as mental, is the first step towards meaning, it is accomplished as meaning in taking the form of a language. Desire translates itself eventually into language. This says that human meaningfulness accomplishes itself in the appropriation of language. Concerning this, we could point out that the unconscious is not accessible to us, and we could not even be informed of its existence, except through the fact that it is identified through language, at least through linguistic terms. This means that the topographical structure would not be made manifest without terms such as 搖nconscious, 損re-conscious, and 揷onsciousness. And the structure of ego would not be made explicit except by terms such as 揑d, 揈go, and 揝uper-ego. Also the whole process of investment of energy would not be accessible without the psychoanalytic terms for naming them and the psychoanalytic discourse for making explicit their structure and dynamism. In short, we can say that our desire, with its original act of strangification, and its tendency to express in representations and to construct them further by formal structures, prepares for the emergence of language and its eventual development of rationality. VI. Emergence of Language as Intelligible Structuration of Representations If the first step towards meaningfulness is the appropriation of nonverbal representations, its further, more articulate step that includes rational meaning, is to appropriate verbal and therefore linguistic representations. From our childhood, through the generosity of our significant others who talk to us, we learn to speak and thereby establish a meaningful world. Thus language could be considered as a gift from many others without expecting any return. When we grow up, we learn more skillful, specified, professional languages in different levels of schools, in society, and in our professions, and thereby enrich our meaningful world and make our meaning more precise. The so-called 揼rowing up is not only a psycho-physical fact, not only a process of education/self-education, it is above all a process of meaning formation, and a process of transcendence, a process of reception and creation, together with inner and outer transformation; that is, a process of strangification and self杛eflection. On these new levels of meaningfulness, we proceed from the initial phase in which the desiring desire strangifies into representations, to the subsequent phase of appropriation of language. Translatability on these levels means the possible transference of one type of representation and logical structuration of linguistic terms to another types of representation and linguistic structuration. The emergence of language could be considered as the emergence of rationality, in the sense that language concretizes the intelligence抯 expressive, evocative, and structural functions. Language is expressive in going through a process of interpretation. Expression is accompanied by the intervention of naming or appellation, these are already under the act of interpretation. For example, when I say that an object, such as an apple, is 搑ed, this is not only expressive of a kind of sensation that I have of that object in question. The term 搑ed also gives a linguistic interpretation to a whole physio-psychological process that happened in me. Also it could be said otherwise, such as hong (}) in Mandarin or aang in Taiwanese. Nevertheless, the common physio-psychological process could serve there as the basis of their translatability. Language is also evocative, in the sense that the pronouncement of a certain kind of language leads to a certain kind of psychosomatic reaction in the listeners. It is therefore a way of intersubjective synergism, in which words, in serving as expressive of meaning, meanwhile provoke a certain psychosomatic state, consciously or unconsciously. This evocative function of language has been not only long well grasped by the magicians, but also by the Greek philosophers. In calling the name of one thing or one person, one does not only exercise the act of appellation, one also touches thereby upon the nature of the thing or the person concerned. To evoke a name is to appeal to a certain state of affairs. Although there are different ways of naming, there common background is this intentional or nonintentional tendency toward self-transcendence by way of idealization, and thus this could serve as their common translatability. Thus this is good advice for the psychotherapy: the language of the patient is meaningful in that it is expressive of his or her mental state. Seen from this perspective, the language of the patient is the more spontaneous the better for his/her healing. However, the language of the psychoanalyst is meaningful in the sense that it is more on the evocative side. It evokes in the patient a certain kind of mental state, either emotional, intellectual, or simply unconscious. In this perspective the language of a psychoanalyst should be technically controlled. In other words, the analyst should be careful of what he/she says, because his/her words are there to help the patient to restore the right way towards meaningfulness, especially by bringing out his desire into meaningful representations and language, and not for the patient to remain distorted in the realm of unconsciousness. Finally, language is also a kind of structuration by putting linguistic terms into a certain intelligible connection. The 搃ntelligible connection could be different in different cultures; for example, in Western sense of 損redication, that is, in 搒ubject + copula + predicates structure. However, it could be otherwise, as in the case of Chinese classical rhetoric. Classical Chinese does not have an explicitly distinctive classification of nouns, copulas, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, etc. This is not to say that classical Chinese does not contain these parts of speech, but that it has not developed an explicit grammar regarding the analytic structure of these parts. Indeed, the 搒ubject + copula + predicates structure, and the act of predication, are not its major concern. The best part of Chinese classical language consists in its relational structuration and affective intensity, not in the 搒ubject-predicate structure, even if it does not lack such grammatical structures. For example, in the Mencius claim that 揾uman nature is good, or Xunzi抯 claim that, 揾uman nature is evil, the meanings of these claims should be determined in the broader context, in the whole paragraph in relation to other texts. Semantic meaning is determined by a kind of dynamic contextualism which is involved in the logic of relation, though articulable into logical syntax. However it is always with much more affective overtone. Thus, Chinese theoretical discourse did not express itself through propositional logical structures, and it has never linguistically explored its own grammatical structures in order to establish a grammar-logical system to regulate its theoretical discourse, like the case of Ancient Greek science, logic, and grammar. The earliest Chinese grammar, like Mashi wentong (General Introduction to Chinese Grammar by the Ma Brothers [Ma Xiangbo and Ma Jianzhong]) published in 1898, was based on Western grammar, more precisely on Latin grammar, which is used to establish a preliminary outline for its own system of Chinese grammar. In comparison, in the West, Aristotle successfully developed the logic of 搒ubject + copula + predicates structure, and explored the structures of thought (logic) via the Greek grammatical structure, and then ontological classification (existence) through human thinking structures. Then, in Mediaeval philosophy, 搄udgment (or in modern terms, propositions) as the accomplishment of human cognition was the outcome of the combination or separation of the subject and the predicate. Combination or separation could already be seen as a kind of structuration and calculation. This was made evident in Modern times by Hobbes and Hume. For example, Hobbes said in Leviathan, that 搕he most noble and profitable inventions of all other, was that of speech, consisting of names and appellations; whereby men register their thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which they, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions, bears and wolves. This structural function of our linguistic competence concerns most with the nature of rationality. For me, Hobbes had since the beginning of modernity seized upon the function of rationality as calculation of names when he said, 揥hen a man reasons, he does nothing but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from substraction of one sum from another.... For reason, in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and substracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon, for the making and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon ourselves; and signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckoning to other men. Summing up, we can say that rationality consists of the calculation of representations and even logical structuration of linguistic terms, and thereby offers possibilities and operable steps for human choices and human actions. Even if Chinese Classical Language didn抰 explicitly use the structure of predication, whereas Western language uses logical structure, that is predication and calculation as structuration, nevertheless all refer to a certain intelligible connection to organize their language. To look for these intelligible connections is to look for their common translatability. In the construction of meaning, our desiring desire strangifies itself by going to many others, to other body, other sex or other values, etc., in tending towards producing different levels of representations. Then, the emergence of rationality structuralizes the representations into a meaningful world of language. In the case of science, rationality proceeds first by strangifying itself into the construction of empirical data, then comes back to its own function of structuration as exemplified in logic and mathematics, which offers possibilities of action by unfolding intelligible structures. However, the emotional/affective manifestations and rational proposition are not in discontinuous opposition. They are still in a range of continuous development. Let me take our mental activities related to non-propositional attitude and propositional attitude as an example. In the case of non-propositional attitudes, such as being in pain, thirsty, itching, hunger, etc., although sometimes without using words, we are also, by these sensations or feelings, informed of our mental state. They are considered by me as manifestations. But this manifestation is always tending to be elaborated by some linguistic interpretations. Whenever there is intervention of linguistic factors, then there is interpretation. Language manifests a state of affairs, but it manifests it in being already a kind of interpretation. For example, when I feel painful, it is not only manifesting a kind of non-propositional attitude. The term 損ain also gives a linguistic interpretation to the whole physio-psychological process of constructing that feeling. Thus a linguistic interpretation is involved, too. In the case of propositional attitude, such as seeing, perceiving, thinking, believing, knowing, judging, inferring, concluding, doubting, hoping, fearing, expecting, etc. These are related to the truth of some propositions, but those in which there are already linguistic interpretation, too. For example, 揟his afternoon, I saw an elephant in the zoo. Not only the naming process gives a linguistic interpretation to what I have seen, also this happens in a specific space-time context, specified by a kind of linguistic construction. Despite all specifications, we can always find in this kind of proposition a kind of construction through linguistic interpretation. If we understand interpretation (hermeneuia) as defined by its Greek meanings, there is always a kind of interpretation involved, as was the case non-propositional attitude. Thus we can say that there is always a sense of linguistic interpretation or translation involved in our propositional and non-propositional attitudes.VII. Communication: Dialogue as mutual strangification The construction of meaning consummates in interpersonal interaction or the act of communication. The example of saying 揑 have pain here to others means it is not only an act of expression, but also an act of interaction or communication, at least implicitly. Before we tackle the social and ethical dimensions of human meaning construction, let抯 take the psychotherapy as example. I have said that when channels for life meaningfulness are distorted, the distortion it produces mental illnesses that need therapy, a process of taking care that renders the channelization for meaningfulness healthy again. What I consider here is not only the psychoanalytic situation in which the patient has dialogue with the analyst, but the ordinary social life in which the personality of the patient is in the process of formation in dialogical interaction with many others, especially with significant others, sometimes more with love and care, another time more with autonomy and struggle. The dialogue between the patient and his analyst is itself a kind of social interaction, a rather closed and artificial one, in which what matters, in my opinion, is dialogue rather than analysis. However, because of its artificiality and enclosure, the phenomenon of 搕ransfer might happen, and it happens very often, in a distorted way, when the patient in the isolated and even excluded situation of the clinic. The situation becomes clearer when we put the patient back into the social group in which he/she belongs. The task of the medico-social and psychotherapeutic team is to assure all facilities for the return and the maintenance of the patient in the social community he/she belongs to. The inalienable citizenship and his membership in the community is to be affirmed now in the post-analytic type of therapy. More important is this necessity to return to the social world, to the Life-world. This dialogical interaction between persons, not only the one between patient and analysts, leads us to a new dimension of meaning construction, that is, the ethical dimension. Here I will move on to talk more positively about the social construction of life meaningfulness. Here we can evoke Husserl抯 concept of life-world, for which one essential element is the social and the intersubjective construction of meaning. In other words, 搇ife-world is a world in the making by human subjectivity and a world in the co-making by the intersubjectivity, in the constitution process of time. The intersubjective element intervenes by necessity in the subjective construction of a meaningful world. The social world is most significant in our common surrounding world. A person should communicate with many other persons in order to achieve mutual understanding and a life of sanity. In the phenomenology of Husserl, it is by abstracting from mutual understanding and communicative acts that we think of a sheer solitary subject and therefore also of his purely egoist world. Husserl has situated a communicative act in the relation of a person to other persons. This is more important for co-constructing a social meaning of existence than Habermas notion of communicative act. Communication in Habermas sense is a kind of argumentation, a process of confronting thesis with anti-thesis, and of searching for consensus in a higher and commonly acceptable proposition. But communication in Husserl抯 sense is not merely linguistic and intellectual, it also includes evaluative and practical processes such as love and counter-love, hate and counter-hate, confidence and reciprocal confidence. Thus Husserl has made explicit the ethical dimension of communication, not limiting itself to argumentative debate as in Habermas case. The terms 揷ommunicative act is used by Husserl to express the social construction of meaning. For Husserl, 揑t is a matter for the experience of empathy, in its unfolding, to instruct me about the other's character, about his knowledge and abilities...etc.We can say that empathy is a way to the other's mind through speaking the other's language. Empathy accomplishes itself in speaking the other抯 language in order to understand them and to make oneself understood. Empathy does not only constitute interpersonal relationships, it could also be extended to the relationships of marriage, friendship, and social community. On this point, Husserl抯 concept of social co-construction of meaning is quite similar to that of Confucian extension of ren from interpersonal relationships to friends and society. It is in this sense that we could understand the social and ethical dimension of meaningful construction. Speaking with many others, especially speaking with significant others such as lovers, family members, and friends, since they constitute the core of our socially meaningful existence, are essential for restoring the way to sanity on the social level. The extension of this social construction of meaningful life through the extension of ren or empathy in larger and larger social circles is the way to fuller fulfillment of one抯 self in its social and ethical dimensions. We could say that the extension of Confucian ren or Husserlian empathy prepares the way to strangification in the broad sense, that is, to speak with many others in their languages or languages understandable to them. In this way, social and ethical dimensions of our existence are not to be considered as external constraints conducive to alienation, but rather to be considered as an extension and fulfillment of a saner way of life. In dialogue, translation becomes a double process of mutual strangification. I should say things in a way understandable to you, and you say things in a way understandable to me. If I speak to a child, I should say it as understandable to a child. If I speak to my parents, I should say it as understandable to my parents. That抯 why Mencius says, 揑f you cannot extend with empathy(strangify), you cannot even keep well your parents or children. Indeed, if one cannot translate what one wants to say into languages understandable to others, one will not be able to keep others to one抯 life, such as one抯 parents, wife, and children. VIII. Union with Ultimate Reality and Positive Function of Body A lot still could be said about the representing process, however, now I should turn to the question: whether we in a certain sense go beyond to the ultimate reality, somehow in the sense of mysticism, which, as I defined it, is a direct union with the ultimate reality, and whether in mystic experience we still have reference to our body. I should say that, human being is longing for the ultimate reality in his ultimate concern, without which human being is always, as St. Augustine says, in a state of anxiety. For me, in analogy to the fact that our thirsty and desire for water show that there do exist water, there should be somewhere an ultimate reality fort human being to attain. In fact, along human history there have been so many mystic masters and they are the factual prove that human can have union with ultimate reality, whether this is God, Ala, Dao, Buddha etc. There were some mystic masters affirm the necessity of surpassing human sensibility, even to the extent of asceticism, in such a way that the role of the human body seems to be minimized. In this context, we have to ask: is there any positive role for the human body in the mystic experience? As I see it, if the spiritual exercise of any religious practice requires a radical negation of body, with all manners of asceticism, even masochism, it is a token of weakness of one抯 soul, not a showcase of strength of will, so as to be assured of its own strength by the negation of body, the gift from God as imago Dei. This negation presupposes, on the ontological level, a body-mind dualism; on the moral level, the negation of human desire for a life of sanity; and on the theological level, the misunderstanding of the doctrine of incarnation. Even without the above presuppositions, we can still take the surpassing of body and ascetic practice merely as methodological necessity. On this point, St. John of the Cross seems to hold a more balanced view. In The Ascent of Mount Carmel and The Dark Night, he envisions a journey through of a darkness of the senses, prior to the darkness of the soul. His first Stanza reads as follows, One dark night, Fired with love抯 urgent longings, --Ah. the sheer grace!-- I went out unseen, My house being know all stilled. In The Ascent of Mount Carmel, St. John of the Cross explains this stanza in the following way: In this stanza the soul desires to declare in a summary fashion that it departed on a dark night, attracted by God and enkindled with love for Him alone....All this deprivation is wrought in the purgation of the sense. That is why the poem proclaims that the soul departed when the house was stilled, for the appetites of the sensory part was stilled and asleep in the soul, and the soul was still in them. One is not freed from the suffering and anguish of the appetites until they are tempered and put to sleep. St. John of the Cross does not hold a position of body-mind dualism, as we can see clearly in these words: 搕he appetite of the sensory part was stilled and asleep in the soul, and the soul was still in them. Here the metaphor of 憇leeping gives us an impression of body-soul harmony, although not without some tension between the two. The necessity for purgation of the senses and surpassing of the body constitute merely a methodological necessity, in order for the human soul to be freed from sufferings and from the anguish of unfulfilled appetite, not at all an ontological position. In this mystic experience, there is no discrimination of a detestable body from a pure soul. On this point, Daoist spirituality is very similar. On the one hand, it emphasizes the bracketing together of all our kinesthetic and perceptual activities, intellectual reasoning and conceptualization, social norms and values; but, on the other hand, it is a spiritual practice beginning with the control of body posture and breathing, in order to diminish one抯 desire and to prepare for an intuition of the essence of all things. In chapter 10 of the Daodejing, Laozi clearly describes the procedure leading towards the intuition of essence. Can you keep your ying(遯) (spiritual soul) and po(D)( bodily soul) united in embracing the One without letting them be separated? Can you concentrate your qi(#l) (vital force) and reach the highest degree of suppleness like an infant? Can you clean and purify your speculative mirror so it becomes spotless? Can you love the people and govern the state without resorting to actions? Can you play the role of the female in serving to the opening and closing of the Gate of Heaven? When you understand and penetrate into the four great realms of beings, can you know them not intellectually? This text describes Daoist spiritual practice step by step. Let me analyze these steps in the following way: 1. First, one has to keep one抯 spiritual soul and bodily soul united in embracing the One. Here, ying (遯) means linguistically the same as hun (B) which is the spiritual soul, whereas po (D) means bodily soul that, when tranquil, assures and preserves external human shape. In our daily movements, these two souls function separately, which is why according to Laozi, one has to keep them united in embracing the One, which is dao. 2. Second, one has to regulate one抯 breathing and concentrate on one抯 vital life-force. Through breathing most naturally, one purifies one抯 spirit of all disturbing mental representations and false consciousness, and, more positively, one returns to the original state of one抯 vital life-force and becomes as supple as an infant, which is a metaphor for the original state of human existence. 3. Third, one should cleanse and purify one抯 own consciousness, using a method similar to that of phenomenological reduction, so as to render the human spirit as clear and spotless as a mystic mirror. Through this mystic mirror one can have intuition into the nature of all things by letting them be themselves. Intuition of essence is therefore the ultimate outcome of this act of 揷leansing and purifying. However, for Laozi, to have intuition of the essence of all things is not for the purpose of determining them in science. Instead, it is to see them returning to their origin and becoming thereby authentically themselves. Thus the concept is different from Husserl抯 Wessenschau. 4. After having accomplished the three steps of self-cultivation above, one may proceed to the matters of loving the people and governing the state. The principle for these is given here as the principle of no-action, which means no particular actions disturbing people but nevertheless leaving nothing undone. 5. Then we reach the higher level of serving Heaven. Here Laozi proposes the principle of femininity, passivity and weakness. In Chapter 40 of the Daodejing, Laozi says, 揜eversion is the action of dao. Weakness is the function of dao. This means that one should passively follow the way of dao and act in total accordance with its demand, without any strong will of one抯 own, and without any desire of domination. Let dao be Itself. Here we encounter the most profound mystic experience of Daoism: to follow dao with the highest degree of passivity, to let the rhythm of dao pour into and fill up one抯 own mind, and to let one抯 mind be brought away by it. That is to say, to abandon one抯 tiny self in the rhythmic, spontaneous movement of the Great dao. For me, even if Laozi uses a method similar to Husserl抯 phenomenological reduction, and also obtains the result of Wesenschau, the Wesenschau of Laozi is still quite different from that of Husserl. The Wesenschau of Husserl consists of a fulfilling gaze on the eidos of things by an impartial pure ego. On the other hand, Laozi has already transcended the self-limit of human subjectivity and therefore transcended the presupposition of a pure ego and gone beyond the limits of any philosophy of subjectivity. Also, it is not a fulfilling gaze on the essence of things. His Wesenschau is resulted from an attitude of letting things be the way they are. It lets things manifest themselves in their own ways. What Laozi proposes here is to let dao itself manifest itself in the way itself manifests itself. For Laozi, this is the real function of the 搈ystic mirror. The 搈ystic mirror achieves its highest function only when it renders manifest Dao or the Being of things in themselves. Laozi抯 Wesenschau is therefore resulted from Seinslassen, letting Being be Itself, and not as in Husserl抯 case, according to which Wesenschau is resulted from a dominating regard of the essence of things by our subjectivity. This reminds us of what Laozi says: 揟o let the being of body manifest itself, that is the way we intuit the essence of body. To let the being of family manifest itself, that is the way we intuit the essence of family. To let the community manifest its own being, tt is the way we intuit the essence of community. To let the being of country manifest itself, that is the way we intuit the essence of country. Let the being of all-under-heaven manifest themselves, that is the way we intuit the essence of all-under-heaven.IX. Words of Conclusion From desiring desire in our body, our project of meaningfulness accomplished itself in its union with the ultimate reality, the final steps of fulfilling our interiority. Here Centrality and Commonality could say indeed 揑n achieving centrality and harmony, heaven and earth will be in their right position and all things therein will be nourished and flourish, and Laozi could say that 揑n serving to the opening and closing of the Gate of Heaven, can you play the role of the female? The issue of interiority starts with desiring desire that go outside of itself to the other and many others, and accomplished itself in the union with the ultimate reality. For those who are on the road, we will have always a mixed experience of anxiety and happiness. This is the story I would tell of the topics 搃nteriority, desire and representing process. If I am allowed to extend the ideas I am developing here to the area of intercultural philosophy, I would say that, philosophy that is thinking on intercultural dialogue should find its way in between the creative tension of manifestation and interpretive construction, strangification and self-reflection, transcendence and immanence. It should be able to make clear the dynamic tensions between ultimate reality and its manifestations, desire for meaningfulness and its mediation by the representing process. Chinese Mahayana Buddhism starts with Seng Zhao抯 critique of Chinese appropriation of Buddhism by Daoist concepts such as being and non-being, in seeing both as empty, therefore returns to Buddhist concept os emptiness. Among three meanings of emptiness, he prefers the meaning of no attachment sigifying spiritual freedom, and he started to use the concept of xin(mind/heart). This emphasis, through the mediation of Awakening of ofaith in the Mahayana, which unfolds the concept of xin mind/heart, and propose the theory of On Mond/Heart open two gates. After this, all Chinese Mahayana schools, including Tiantai, Huayan and Chan Schools, all use the concept of xin (Mind?Heart) as representing the Buddhist concept of ultimate reality. It has the advnatge of exploring human interiority, however, it has also turned Chinese thought into a philosophy of immanence.  (Dai Zheng, Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius, from SB, p.713-714)   Five Conducts (wu xing 擭L), in Unearthed bambooslips in Chu Tombs of Guodian (韾梌Zi揦鵽!|), Beijing:7enwu Press, 1998, pp. 31, 149.  Gu Baotian(g橏[0u), Zhang Zhongli(5_郷)R), New Translation of Laozi XiangEr Commentaries(癳oP[骮>r鑜), Chapters 4, 13, 21, 25, 29, Taipei: Sangmin Bookstore, 19 /<=ST^_djmn篋傯刻蔡巠dyQy>Q>%h h.VCJaJfHq %h hCJaJfHq (h hCJaJfHo(q (h h.VCJaJfHo(q h h.VOJaJh h濨5丆JaJh h8CJOJaJh h5CJOJaJh htICJOJaJh h UCJOJaJh h)CJOJaJh h鎫>CJOJaJh h羥CJOJaJ/0=ST^ frd1$H$UDd]`gd \t$ & Fda$gd鳣dH$UDd]gd.V $da$gd.V$d`a$gdCk $da$gdCk Gd`gdCk! A c g . 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%-6----------....h...........//x///////0暄暄晟炕痘痘動Н化化稊噛kykykykykykikykykUh鵹h@*5丆JOJPJh鵹h3^@5丆JOJPJh鵹h@*CJOJPJ%jh鵹h@*0JCJOJPJUh鵹hWy 6 h鵹hWy hWy o(hWy jhWy 0JUh6bh6bo(0h6bh6b6丅*CJ]乫Hphq *h6bh6bB*CJfHphq )---.89欘*瘩z匂脈h愾旞+Tcq $dG$a$gd1G$gd1G$gd;8 $dG$a$gd學G$gdWy dH$UDd]`gd6b97, pp. 9, 53, 104, 124, 144. Laozi Middle Scripture(P[-N搣), in Aothodox Daozang (ckq}S愊), Volume 37, (Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 1985), pp. 302, 314.  Lacan. Jacques., Ecrits, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966. p.16; and The Seminar. Book III. The Psychoses, 1955-56. trans. Russell Grigg. London: Routledge, 1993. p.167 Wang Bi and others, Laozi Sizong (Four Versions of Laozi), Taipei: Da An Press, 1999, p. 37.  Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980a 25. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by J Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 1552.  Rene Huyghe, L抋rt et L抋me, Paris:Flammarion, 1980, p. 57. May I translate it temporarily as such, 揑n order that human eye be struck by this sensational touch where it tends, since it is open this way, to liberate an order, so that human spirit, taking position behind it and solitary with its task, may apply to this confusion, and bring to it this order and this intelligence of things that is given birth with the form, there must be in this nature received in darkness that which is touched by the light. She stays hidden, invisible, unknown, however, the radiance of light strikes us. The light manifests itself. And she becomes a profile.  Unlike Jarmo Valkola, in his Thoughts on Images梐 philosophical evaluation, takes 搑epresentation as higher form of image closer to art works and language, I am using 搑epresentation is its earliest form of kinesthetic features. Cf. Jarmo Valkola, Thoughts on Images梐 philosophical evaluation, Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2012, pp. 81-87. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, translated by James Strachey, (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), p.455  "We may suppose that a good part of the intermediate work done during the formation of a dream, which seeks to reduce the dispersed dream-thought to the most succinct and unified expression possible, proceed along the line of finding appropriate verbal transformations for the individual thoughts." Ibid.  揌uman Nature coming from Heaven, in Unearthed bambooslips in Chu Tombs of Guodian (韾梌Zi揦鵽!|), Beijing:7enwu Press, 1998, p. 180, translated by myself.  Ibid., translated by myself.  Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by C.B. Mcpherson, New York Penguin Books, 1968, p.100  Ibid., pp.110-111 The other meaning of the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt is analyzed in my Life-world and Reason in Husserl's Philosophy of Life, in Analecta Husserliana, Vol.XVII, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984) pp.105-116 Husserl has seen this very clearly when he says, 揟hus in general the world exists not only for isolated individual but for the community of human beings, and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized. E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology , translated by Davis Carr, (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970), p. 163  In the Ideen II of Husserl, he concretely describes, 揑n this way relations of mutual understanding are formed: speaking elicits response; the theoretical, valuing, or practical appeal, addressed by the one to the other, elicits, as it were, a response coming back, assent or refusal and perhaps a counter-proposal, etc. In these relation of mutual understanding, there is produced a conscious mutual relation of persons, at the same time a unitary relation of them to a common surrounding world. Husserl, Ideen II, (The Hague: Nijhof, 1952), S. 192  Ibid., S.193 Ibid., S.194  "Sociality is constituted by specifically social, communicative acts, acts in which the ego turns to others and in which the Ego is conscious of these others as ones towards which it is turning, and ones which, furthermore, understand this turning, perhaps adjust their behavior to it and reciprocate by turning toward that Ego in acts of agreement or disagreement...etc." Ibid., Ibid., S.228  The concept of "strangification" is originally proposed by Fritz Wallner as merely an epistemological strategy for interdisciplinarity. I myself have extended this concept to a strategy for intercuturality in my Confucianism, Taoism and Constructive Realism (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 1994), and now, also as a strategy of religious dialogue. In a communicative context, strangification in a broad sense means simply the act of speaking the language understandable to the other. &(028漓攆 DP`b~庬旐橅滍烅犿7胥胥胥胥胥胥芟壤裙裙炔珦剅h[h鵹haVB*PJph%%%h_\B*PJph%%%"h鵹haV6>*B* PJ]乸h h鵹h;8>*B* PJph !h鵹h;8B*CJPJaJph%%% h鵹haV h鵹h9 h鵹hqy h鵹h$_h_\h16 h鵹h1jh鵹h10JU h鵹h@*h鵹h@*5丆JOJPJh鵹h3^@5丆JOJPJ789:;O[}~嶎楊欘氼︻鱉堿款揞)*+9Ghijk綢瘩戾匱事丫咽馴獩摏獉tftZNZNth鵹h7 5丆JOJh鵹h0\5丆JOJh塛hMU56丆JOJh鵹hMU5丆JOJ$jh鵹hMU0J5丆JOJUh鵹h0\6 h鵹h0\h塛hN?6 h鵹hN?jh鵹hN?0JUh塛h鵹h[ u6 h鵹ho,_ h鵹h[ ujh鵹h[ u0JU h鵹haV&h鵹haVB*fHph%%%q 瘩雕今蔭 ;IS滘濖◎膀蒡3RSz{棒掉恤陽蒸拄弭牯(DZ匂嗹螂灄湔湔湔瀠湔灄瀠攘沽擦攘殲摎搵儃儖矒矒灀矒灔h鵹h96h鵹hl6h鵹h;86 h鵹h;8h~g h鵹h9jh鵹h90JU h鵹hlh鵹h U6 h鵹h Ujh鵹h U0JU h鵹h眃h鵹h7O6 h鵹h7O h鵹h]ojh鵹h]o0JU0嗹脈嚙增桷 hj愾掲檻鑷JOc旞書區l岡欩蠃+,4<Cc欫(012TUcdqr稞瘕KR桛譽([q遢逯屐逕祿坊苫ɑɑ苫ɑɑɑɑ苫苫苫苫傘弧粷弧化粷宦h橬S h鵹h[ h鵹hh鵹h6h#1 h鵹h h鵹h蝒jh鵹h0JU h鵹hnh鵹h U6 h鵹h Ujh鵹h U0JU h鵹h9>q稞             7 8 9 : ;  d7$8$gd. $a$dgd Ugd}G$gd1                      3 4 5 6 7 8 9 : ; 玨蘢纈妥纈蘢帕沽沽沽沽杯睙杯洍翂hvghR,5丆JOJaJh hh黤h黤mHnHsHuh耼jh耼Ujh黤Uh黤h}h}o( h}aJh} h}o(hh}aJUjh}0JUhh橬S h鵹h$ St. John of the Cross, The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross, translated by Kicran Kavanaugh O.C.D. And Otilio Rodriguez O.C.D., (Washington D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1979), p. 68  Ibid., p.74  Laozi Sizhong., Ch.10, p. 7. English translation mine. 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- ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !4w-   - - -   2 -wcA - - -  2 -cfter - - -  2 -cfeatur- - -  2 -cing- - -   2 -c - - -  &2 -cthree meanings of   - - -   2 -cc- - -  2 -icin- - -  2 -v cteriority - - -   2 -c in Chinese p - - -  /2 -chilosophy, that is, the    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !X:H-   - - -  b2 JH:cCentrality, the Mind and transcendence within interiority,   - - -   2 Jc - - -  2 JcI will  - - -  2 Jcextend- - -   2 J0c - - -  2 J6cthe f- - -  2 JU cunction of    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !fWH-   - - -  ,2 gHcmind to desire, feelin  - - -  ;2 g cg and thought, in particular the - - -   2 gc - - -  =2 g!cconcept of unselfish desire, and   - - -  2 gcthe  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !quH-   - - -  "2 Hcidea of the non  - - -   2 c-- - -  |2 Kcduality between body and mind, all in extending the concept of interiority        - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !MH-   - - -  h2 H>cto the extent of seeing desire as the locus from where arises      - - -  ,2 cthe dynamism of human      - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !wH-   - - -  /2 Hcmeaningfulness of life.  - - -  t2 FcI will make the distinction between desiring desire, desirable desire      - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !H-   - - -  )2 Hcand desired desire. - - -  q2 DcDesiring desire as the first movement of meaningfulness, translates      - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  R2 H/citself into different levels of representations   - - -   2 wc:- - -   2 |c - - -  2 cbeg- - -  2  cinning by - - -  82 csensual representations, like   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Y2 H4ctactic, tasty, acoustic, visual, in a word, imagery,   - - -   2 c - - -  2 cthen- - -   2 c - - -  .2 cthe emergence of mental   - - -   2 hc  - - - - - - - - - - - -  "2 4Hcrepresentations - - -  _2 48c, then verbal representations, first oral then written.     - - -   2 4c  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  h2 Qw>cThe dialectical movements between desiring desire and the desi    - - -  .2 Q1cred desire is thus the  - - - - - - - - -  2 nH\ccommon origin of work of art, though their structure is quite different according to levels          - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !|-   - - -  #2 Hcof complexities.  - - -   2 c - - -  t2 FcI will see the development of meaningfulness through the representing        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !wH-   - - -  \2 H6cprocess developing into higher and higher level, until   - - -   2 c - - -  D2 &ctranscending itself into encountering    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !hH-   - - -  22 Hcwith the ultimately real.  - - -  2 cI - - -  b2 :cwill combine both phenomenology and Chinese philosophy in          - - -  - @ !rH-   - - -  %2 Hcdoing all these.  - - -   2 c  - - -  - @ !%w-   - - -  2 wOcThus we will begin by the primordial level of body and desire, then proceed to         - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - @ !oH-   - - -  >2 H"cdiscuss the emergence of different  - - -   2 6c - - -  /2 :clevels of meaningfulness  - - -   2 c - - -  2 cin - - -  2  crepresenting - - -  2 Vcprocess - - -  2 c, until  - - -  - @ !.+H-   - - -  M2 ;H,cmystical union with the ultimate reality.     - - -   2 ;vc  ------1燦砰- - - @Times New Roman- - - - - - - - - --- 2 XH cKey terms - - -  2 Xc: - - -   2 Xc  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  F2 uH'cBody, Desiring desire, Desirable Desire    - - -  82 uc, Desired Desire, Representing   - - -   2 uc - - -  2 u cProcess,   - - - - - - - - - - - -   2 HcT- - -   2 Pcranslatability- - -   2 c  ---  2 Hc  ---  2 Hc  ---  2 Hc   "SystemH- - ccbbaa u? 脹諟.摋+,0 X`lt|    !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`acdefghinorRoot Entry F@&5!q@Data 1Table鸘WordDocument 8SummaryInformation(;HLDocumentSummaryInformation8bMsoDataStoreX!P+!YU0KDTCW30A==2X!P+!Item  2PropertiesUCompObj n   FMicrosoft Word 97-2003 ゅン MSWordDocWord.Document.89瞦